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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND.

*

Plaintiff,

*

*

*

v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ROBERT L. SEITZ,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*

Case No. 920141-CA
Priority No. 7

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR REVIEW OF ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

I.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission of Utah's

Order

Denying

Jurisdiction

Motion

for

for

this

Review

appeal

is

issued
found

on
in

February

Utah

Code

7, 1992.
Annotated

Sections 35-1-82.53 and 35-1-86 (1988).

II.
1.

Whether,
Disability

as

a

ISSUES PRESENTED
matter

Compensation

of

law,

this

case, having

Permanent

been

subject

Total
to a

final Permanent Total Disability Order by the Industrial
Commission

and

with

Order

that

completely
and

closed

out by full compliance

in accordance

with

the

permanent total disability Statute, is beyond the

applicable

jurisdiction of the Commission to reopen more than 40 years
later

and

statutory

order

additional

amendment

compensation

enacted

30 years

by

after

applying
the

a

injury?

(R-237)
2.

Whether, as a matter of law, the levels of compensation
benefits on the one hand and compensation liability on the
other are determined by the Statute in effect at the time
of the injury and thus cannot be altered by a Statute 30
years

later which attempts

to increase of enlarge those

benefits and which creates an entirely new liability (in
this Plaintiff) for such increased benefits,
3c

(R-237-238)

In any event, whether the 1977 Amendment to the Permanent
Total

Disability

Statute

(Section

35-1-67)

is

in

fact

reasonably susceptible to the interpretation accorded to it
by the Commission majority as conferring an entirely new
lifetime benefit to applicant and imposing an entirely new
liability upon this Plaintiff, rather than simply combining
separate
providing
increases.

paragraphs
recipients

of

existing

each

with

lifetime
identical

benefits

and

cost-of-living

(R-23 8)

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Standard of Appellate Review applicable to each of the
above Issues is "correction of error" since they involve questions
of

law or

Statutory

construction

and

Commission's determination is required.

2

thus

no

deference

Bevans v. Industrial

to the

Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

IV.

APPLICABLE STATUTES

The only relevant Statutory law consists of a series of
Amendments to the Permanent Total Disability Provisions of what was
then entitled the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.

As pertinent to

this controversy, these Amendments are set forth as follows:
A.

H.B. No. 6, in effect July 1, 1945, amending Permanent
Total Disability Section 42-1-63, Utah Code Annotated 1943
and providing for a dollar limitation on Permanent Total
Disability benefits. This is the Statute in effect at the
time of Applicant's permanent total disability injury on
July 28, 1948 and is attached as Exhibit "A". (R-243-245)

B.

S.B. No. 43, in effect May 9, 1939, showing the Permanent
Total Disability Statute in effect prior to the Amendments
of 1945 set forth above.
The pertinent provision is
Section 42-1-63 Revised Statutes of Utah and is attached as
Exhibit "B" (R-247). Note that lifetime benefits from the
Employer were provided until removed by the July 1, 1945
Amendment in Exhibit "A".

C.

S.B. No. 289, in effect March 5, 1949, completely changed
the Permanent Total Disability procedures and provisions,
requiring for the first time referral to the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation before a final PTD Order could be
issued.
This Amendment also restored lifetime benefits
after maximum benefits required from the Employer/Carrier
had been satisfied.
This Amendment, attached as Exhibit
"C",
(R-248-250) also provided
for the first time,
liability on the part of the Special (Second Injury) Fund
for such lifetime benefits following termination of the
Employer/Carrier obligation.

D.

S.B. 242, in effect July 1, 1971, increased PTD benefits
and in addition provided a minimum compensation benefit for
all persons then receiving lifetime benefits from the
Special (Second Injury) Fund. (Exhibit "D") (R-250 at 253)

E.

S.B. 77, in effect July 1, 1973, increased PTD benefits and
increased, also beginning July 1, 1971, compensation
benefits for all permanently and totally disabled persons
who were then receiving benefits from the Special Fund.
Exhibit "E" (R-254 at 257)

3

F.

S.B. No. 3, in effect April 4, 1974, increased PTD benefits
and also increased to $50.00 per week, the PTD compensation
for persons currently receiving permanent total disability
benefits from the Special Fund.
In addition, this
Amendment picked up persons who were still receiving
lifetime benefits from the Employer/Carrier under Statutes
in effect prior to the March 5, 1949 Amendment which
charged the Special Fund with all lifetime benefits after
termination of Employer/Carrier
liability.
This 1974
Amendment, attached as Exhibit "F" (R-259 at 260), required
the Special Fund to pay the difference between the amount
then being paid to such persons by the Employer/Carrier and
the $50.00 weekly minumum set by the Statute for all
persons then on the Second Injury Fund payroll.
This
Amendment did not apply to anyone not receiving lifetime
benefits at the date of the Amendment.

G.

H.B. 297, in effect May 10, 1977, combined the two
paragraphs pertaining to minimum benefits for Second Injury
Fund participants set forth in the 1974 Statute and also in
the 1975 Statute and increased to $75.00 the minimum weekly
amount for all persons receiving benefits from the Fund.
The Statute is attached as Exhibit "G" (R-262 at 265).
Applicant has alleged that this Amendment somehow creates a
new entitlement in Applicant to lifetime benefits and
imposes an entirely new liability upon this Plaintiff for
all of those benefits. Plaintiff denies both allegations
in their entirety.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
There is no controversy as to the facts involved in this

case.
1.

Briefly, they may be summarized as follows:
Applicant was

severely

his

for

benefits

specified

permanent

in the Statute

Section

42-1-63

(Exhibit

M

deleted

injured in July, 1948; therefore,

U.C.A.

total

were

those

in effect at that time, i.e..
1943,

A U ) (R-243 to R245).
existing

disability

language

as

Amended

July

1,

1945

That Statute specifically
which

granted

lifetime

compensation benefits in permanent total disability cases

4

(Exhibit

"B") (R-246,247).

The 1945 Amendment

expressly

restricted permanent total disability compensation benefits
to

a

maximum

of

$8,500,

all

to

be

paid

by

the

Employer/Carrier beginning as of the date of the injury.
On August 27, 1948, the Industrial Commission issued its
Order

(attached

as Exhibit

"H") (R-267) awarding maximum

permanent total disability compensation benefits as follows:
"Now therefore, it is Ordered, that Utah Fuel
company pay to Robert Seitz all medical and
hospital expenses incurred, and compensation at
the rate of $25.88 per week, until the amount of
$8,500.00 has been paid."
That Order was made pursuant to Statute; it became final
and was fully satisfied by Employer Utah Fuel Company, thus
completely closing out Applicant's compensation entitlement.
On July 9, 1990, more than forty (40) years following the
satisfaction
Order.

of

Applicant's

Applicant

filed

his

permanent

total

claim

continuing

for

disability
total

disability benefits alleging that the same would be due and
owing

to Applicant

from

the Employers1

Reinsurance Fund

since the Employer has satisfied its legal liability in the
matter.

Incidentally, the record shows that the Employer,

in addition to payment of the Statutory maximum permanent
total

disability

liability

of

$8,500.00

for

Applicant's

Statutory total disability, created a dispatcher position
for the Applicant who remained employed with the Employer
until his retirement in February, 1976 at age 64.
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Plaintiff herein, denied

5

completely
Applicant

any

liability

to

Applicant,

asserting

that

has been paid in full for all permanent total

disability benefits due to him under the Statute in effect
at

the

time

of

his

injury

(Exhibit

"A") (R-243) which

Statute made it clear that there were no payments due to
Applicant after the Statutory maximum of $8,500.00 has been
satisfied

by the Employer.

Employers'

Reinsurance

Statutory

Amendment

At the same time. Plaintiff

Fund

pointed

applicable

out

to

that

the

Applicant's

1945
claim

intentionally and specifically amended the prior permanent
total

disability

(R-246)

which

Statute

provided

of
for

April,

1939

lifetime

(Exhibit

benefits

"B")

from

the

Employer in permanent total disability cases.
Applicant responded, asserting that subseguent legislation
from

1949

disability

through 1977 imposed
liability

upon

the

lifetime permanent total
Second

Injury

Fund

(now

Employers' Reinsurance Fund) after the Employer's liability
has been extinguished, that it operated somehow either to
revive Applicant's original entitlement to permanent total
disability
entitlement

benefits
to

or

to

lifetime

create
benefits

for
from

Applicant
the

a

new

Employers'

Reinsurance Fund, thus entitling Applicant to be placed on
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund payroll for the remainder
of his life at the applicable permanent total disability
rate.
On May 21, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge issued his

6

Order holding that somehow the permanent total disability
Statutory Amendment
lifetime

of 1977 either restored or created a

entitlement

in

Applicant

to

permanent

total

disability benefits from the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund at
the

Statutory

minimum

permanent

total

disability

rate.

(Exhibit "I") (R-268)
On June 20, 1991, Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, hereinafter
called Plaintiff, filed with the full Industrial Commission
its Motion for Review asserting that as a matter of law.
Applicant

has

no

Workers'

Compensation

right

against

Plaintiff or against his Employer Utah Fuel Company (Kaiser
Coal) arising
1948.

out of his

industrial

injury of July 28,

Plaintiff further asserted that this permanent total

disability

compensation

final permanent

having

been

subject

to a

total disability Order by the Industrial

Commission

and

with

Order,

that

case,

completely
was

closed

beyond

out by full

the

compliance

jurisdiction

of

the

Commission to reopen for the alleged purpose of ordering
additional compensation.

(Exhibit "J") (R-273)

On February 7, 1992, the full Industrial Commission in a 2
to 1 decision issued its Order Denying Motion for Review
upholding the Findings and Order of the Administrative Law
Judge

as

evidence

being
in

"supported

light

of

in

this

the whole

case

record".

by

substantial

(Exhibit

(R-279)
Plaintiff, on March 6, 1992, filed with this Court its

7

"K")

Petition

for

Writ

of

Review

seeking

reversal

of

the

Commission's Order and requesting dismissal of Applicant's
claim for further benefits.

VI.
1,

Under

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

established

Utah

Workers

Compensation

Law,

the

Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to reopen
a PTD case based upon the same injury 30 years later where
there is a final Order of PTD and where, as here, there is
no question as to Statutory compliance, or correction of
error in the previous PTD Order.
2*

Workers Compensation liability and the amount and duration
of benefits in Utah Permanent Total Disability cases are
determined

by the Statute

in effect on the date of the

industrial

injury

the

causing

PTD and thus a Statutory

Amendment 30 years later cannot be applied:
new

and

expressly

increased
rejected

benefits

(lifetime)

(1) to create

which

had

been

in the Statute properly applicable to

the injury in question, and (2) to create a new liability
in a party which had no liability whatsoever

under

the

applicable PTD Statute on the date of the injury.
3.

In any event - without conceding any lack of validity in
either of the above-mentioned arguments, neither the 1977
Amendment to the PTD Statute (now Section 35-1-67) nor any
of the prior amendments at various times referred to by
Applicant's counsel, is in fact reasonably susceptible to

8

the interpretation accorded
as

conferring

a

lifetime

it by the Commission majority
benefit

upon Applicant

completely new liability against this Plaintiff.

and a

Instead,

properly construed, it simply combines previous separate
paragraphs applicable to existing lifetime PTD recipients
and provides to them identical cost-of-living increases.

VII.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
UNDER ESTABLISHED UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW.
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
DOES
NOT
HAVE
JURISDICTION
TO
REOPEN
A
PERMANENT
TOTAL
DISABILITY CASE BASED UPON THE SAME INJURY 30
YEARS LATER WHERE THERE IS A FINAL ORDER OF
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND WHERE, AS HERE,
THERE LS NO QUESTION AS TO STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
OR CORRECTION OF ERROR IN THE PREVIOUS PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY ORDER.
This position of Plaintiff is purely a matter of law and
the applicable rationale has been the subject of clear-cut decisions
of this Court as well as the Supreme Court of Utah with reference to
reopening or rearguing claims which have been processed to final
Order as is the case in this controversy.
There was only one industrial accident in this case, that
of July 28, 1948.

That accident was accepted by the Employer as

resulting in Permanent Total Disability (Exhibit "H-2") (R-193).

A

Final Order was issued by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the
Utah Workers Compensation Act applicable
42-1-63 Rev. State of Utah (Exhibit

H

to that injury. Section

B") (R-171-172).

That Order

(Exhibit "H") (R-192) set forth all the benefits to Applicant under

9

Utah Workers Compensation Law and it is acknowledged that the Order
was never questioned or disputed as to the amount or duration of
benefits, or at all.

Indeed, even today there is no claim that the

Order was somehow in error as to amount or duration of benefits or
was left open or undetermined

in any aspect.

Accordingly, it is

conclusive that the Order of August 27, 1948 (Exhiibt "H") (R-192)
was a final Order that set forth all of Applicant's compensations
rights

under

Applicant's

Utah

rights

Law

and,

as

such, was

determinative

of

all

to compensation under applicable Utah Workers

Compensation Law.
Utah Supreme Court Decisions recognizing this principle are
as early as 1924 in Fergusen v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 112,
221

P.1099

(1924).

reaffirmed

in

1967

in

Kennecott

Copper

Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952
(1967)

where

dispositive

it

and

was
that

held
the

that

the

Commission

holding
once

in

having

Fergusen

was

determined

the

matter on the merits did not have jurisdiction to make any other
award.
Following

these

cases,

this

Court

in

Retherford

Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76 (Utah App. 1987) held:

v.,

"that the

jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission over Workers' Compensation
cases

is fixed

by Statute, as is this Court's jurisdiction over

judicial review of the Commission's Orders" (citing authorities) and
further, that

"This Court

is without

jurisdiction to review the

final Order of the Commission because Plaintiff's Petition for Writ
of Review was not timely filed".

739 P.2d 76 at 80..

10

In addition, this Court applied the Supreme Court of Utah's
holding in Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah
1984) that a claimant has an obligation to raise all issued that can
be presented at that time and those issues not raised are waved (739
P.2d at 79, 80).

The Retherford Decision is attached as (Exhibit

"L" ).
Applying

the rationale

of

the above authorities to this

case, it is apparent that Applicant was awarded - and paid - by
Commission

Order

permanent

total

all

the

benefits

disability

Statute.

provided
He

by

did

not

the

applicable

claim

lifetime

benefits which were obtainable as to injuries prior to July 1, 1945
but

were

expressly

permanent

total

deleted

disability

the

July

Statute.

1,
Nor

1945
did

Amendment
he

claim

to

the

lifetime

benefits at that time or in 1949 when the Statute was amended again
to provide

lifetime

benefits

for permanently

and totally injured

workers who qualified under the provisions of that Statute.

Indeed,

even had he applied for or claimed lifetime benefits under the 1949
Amendment,
failure

such claim would properly have been dismissed for (1)

to

raise

the

granting

him

benefits,

Workers'

Compensation

lifetime
and
Law

benefit

(2)
which

question under

clear-cut
determines

Statute in effect on the date of injury.

the Order

application
benefits

of
under

the

(See cases and authorities

referred to in Point 2, to follow).
POINT II
WORKERS COMPENSATION LIABILITY AND THE AMOUNT AND
DURATION OF BENEFITS IN UTAH PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY CASES ARE DETERMINED BY THE STATUTE IN

11

Utah

EFFECT ON THE DATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY
CAUSING THE PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND THUS A
STATUTORY AMENDMENT 30 YEARS LATER CANNOT BE
APPLIED:
(1) TO CREATE NEW AND INCREASED
BENEFITS (LIFETIME) WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSLY
REJECTED IN THE STATUTE PROPERLY APPLICABLE TO
THE INJURY IN QUESTION. AND (2) TO CREATE A NEW
LIABILITY IN A PARTY WHICH HAD NO LIABILITY
WHATSOEVER UNDER THE APPLICABLE PTD STATUTE ON
THE DATE OF THE INJURY.
This

Argument

Compensation Law and

of Plaintiff

is established Utah Workers'

is supported, without exception, by Supreme

Court Decisions as well as decisions of this Court.
Smith

v.

Industrial

Commission.

549

P.2d

448

workman was injured in 1968 and died in 1972.
compensation death benefits under

(Utah,

award

was

not

made

1973 Amendments

until

1976) the

His widow claimed

which increased and enlarged such death benefits.
Commission

In the case of

to the Statute
Even though, the

1975, after

the Amendments

became effective, it was held

by the Commission, affirmed by an

unanimous Supreme Court, that:

"The benefits were definable as to

maximum time and amount, were governed by the wording of the section
on

date

of

injury

(citing

Utah

Road

Commission

v.

Industrial

Commission, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946) and it appears that
the

award

fully

complied

with

or

exceeded

such provision", and

further:
Any additional benefits would not be awardable by
Amendment thereafter, and subsection 4, paragraphs 5
and 6 so amended in 1973 that did enlarge such
benefits would have no application here. 549 P.2d at
449. Attached hereto as Exhibit ,!MH.
The

rationale

of

the

Smith

case,

above,

is

squarely

applicable to this controversy where claimant Seitz was injured
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-JIHI
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j

W . M - already paid in full -

are no I

procedural

'.iuiis I .nil i a 1 J y «ii
ur

du? necessary

lini

Order

of benefits was made

under

I he

Decision
•'ourt

referred

in WiLaat

to

above

nature

r I a i med HI1,, a "correction

the original

.is

lh"ii I
well

Pellegrini,
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Sysj:_e.ms _ y .

in

M I lhe>

I D "clarify"

i a 1 i it a I e

im)

a l.ijiejt !JP<? basis which was specifically denied

him under the J aw in effect on the date ol Ins . • • .
certainly

r >
s

ieased

,R ^ 4 H 250)
* •• *

* \mendment*

v.-.

\mendmer^

•

cen

• .4!- ^i- ) .

•• * •
r

having

i il

I.. i w

ib

i In

771

f ei for"

* h nr h Hie

>

directly

ipp
r ecerr

P.2d

686

i--.;i-

.

(Utah App,

1989),

attched as Exhibit "N", where this Court reviewed and discussed the
general rule of application of the law existing at the time of the
injury

for

determination

of

liability

and

benefits

in Workers1

Compensation cases and also the limited exceptions to the general
rule.

Those

Amendments
enlarge.

exceptions

are

still

procedural

eliminate

or

apply,

rather

destroy

this

than

vested

Court

held:

substantive
rights

or

liability then they may be applied retroactively.

(1) If

and

impose

do

not

greater

Or if they "are

enacted to clarify or amplify how the earlier law should have been
understood, in other words remedial in nature, the Amendments can
still be retroactively applied.11

(Citing cases) (771 P.2d at 687)

This Court then held that a Statutory Amendment which decreased or
diminished

the liability of this Fund

Fund) and

increased

held

(then called Second Injury

the Employer/Carrier percentage liability was

to be substantive

rather

than procedural in nature and not

susceptible to the clarification rule and thus the later Amendment
could not be applied retroactively to reduce the liability of the
Second Injury Fund.

So it is with this case, Applicants injury on

July 28, 1948 entitled
amount of $8,500.

him, without question, only to a maximum

He specifically was by the 1945 Amendment to the

Permanent Total Disability
previously
Statute.

had

been

Statute denied lifetime benefits which

awarded

to workers

injured under

the prior

That award was paid in full by the Employer thus closing

out all compensation benefits.

He now seeks lifetime benefits which

specifically were denied to him and he seeks to impose liability for
those lifetime benefits upon all the employers of the State of Utah
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who

f I na nc e
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Supreme
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,i\\v

] fit ei pt e t a t i on
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R e i n s u i: a n c e

of

this

Couil,

Statute

then

I 1 ' i I ' 11 I I » 1 1

I IIII

P1 a i n. t i f f

r nl I al> i 1 i 1 \

LII

i n t e r p i e t etl

by

do

P l n i n t i t t *s
\ 1111 I | I

in

Hill

position

I " 11 11 II I I I

IIII

on
ll»JW

and increased lifetime benefits properly should IIH dismissed
POINT I I I
IN A N Y EVENT
WITHOUT CONCEDING A N Y LACK OF
VALIDITY
IN EITHER
OF T H E ABOVE-MENTIONED
ARGUMENTS - NEITHER THE 1977 AMENDMENT TO THE
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUTE (NOW SECTION
35-1-67) NOR A N Y OF T H E PRIOR AMENDMENTS A T
VARIOUS TIMES REFERRED TO BY APPLICANT'S COUNSEL,
IS
IN FACT
REASONABLY
SUSCEPTIBLE
T O THE
INTERPRETATION
ACCORDED IT BY THE COMMISSION
MAJORITY AS CONFERRING A LIFETIME BENEFIT UPON
APPLICANT A N D A COMPLETELY N E W LIABILITY AGAINST
THIS PLAINTIFF.
INSTEAD, PROPERLY CONSTRUED, IT
SIMPLY
COMBINES
PREVIOUS
SEPARATE
PARAGRAPHS
APPLICABLE TO EXISTING LIFETIME PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY
RECIPIENTS
A N D PROVIDES
TO THEM
IDENTICAL COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES.
Plaint 11-1
be

dispositive

However

asserted

interpretation
«i 'mint! i ss i on
attached
Statutory

of Applicant's

Plaintiff

Amendments

LM-' I i i.'Yf i.. " "

also

entice

believes

by Applicant

accorded

claim

that

in this

UQJia

IR reasonably

Mi those

Statutes

this I'ourl

interpretation

ol

Chris

" "L

the

Statutory

susceptible

by Applicant

Mi I tie

or hy the

Amendments

have

in rxcliiMively a quest iur of

»r I mi 1 nil n I' r .:i t Ii VP

6* Dicks

Lumber

mmissioi., /JO. . .2d 511 ^^ b^.* V wLah 1990)

1,5

and

1 ru i

11 I

controversy.

to be m.jdo by Mils Court with no deference

e i tin '

^e

in what

l i I'iM'ei •' \ }

', i 'i»

A i I nf Mn' ("<i r t i neti I" f>! a f \if \»t y

to assMst

Commiss * o n.

|M'!» f i i "i

.1 iihlqe

Hardware

the

v.

"la straight forward

Tax

been

cases of statutory interpretation, however, we need not defer to the
agency in question."
Plaintiff

is aware of the oft-asserted principle that the

Act should be liberally construed in favor of according benefits and
that questions of fact in doubt should be construed in favor of the
Employee.

However, it is also well established-as mentioned above -

that where statutory intent is clear and where "the Statute can be
interpret«ted

in accordance

construction, we conclude

with

traditional

rules

of

statutory

that the Legislature has not left this

issue unresolved11, and therefore we need not give any deference to
the

Divisions

(Commission's)

interpretation*

Ferro

v.

Utah

Department

of Commerce, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah App. 1992).

(Exhibit

"O"

attached).

Moreover,

implicit

in

statutory

construction and interpretation is that Appellate courts have the
fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of a
Statute.
Ferro,

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d

Supra,

248, 253, referred to in

181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 63.

Finally, in statutory

interpretation upon review, "Statutes should be read so as to avoid
making any of their provisions surplusage and meaningless" Ferro,
Supra, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 63, citing Downey State Bank v. Major
Blakeney

Corp.,

578 P.2d

1286, 1288

(Utah 1978) and Baqshaw v.

Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990).
It

is

Plaintiff's

belief

that

examination

of

all

the

pertinent Amendments to the Permanent Total Disability provisions of
the applicable Utah Workers Compensation Statute will show beyond
question that the Utah Legislature at no time intended to create

16

lifetime
ii [p.iUy
mi

benefits

with

of

injury

1 0 0 % "liability

fJ I t P P I

"I

-1! H P

' 'li

The
Disability

«ii«1 il

it

summary

intent

various

the

th.H

1.

"A111

Exhibil
the
clalp

I

Disability
inserted
cases

To t a 1

made

by

that

were

Replacement

Note

Exhibit

"P".

i ssued

expressly

Exhibit

"B"
II")

(R--171,

•; I a I mi 11' e ,

Amendment;

ot

lifetime
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first
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relevant
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essential
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as

the

Disability

(H-168-171))

for

Amendment

is

Amendments

Pe r ma nen 1

t tie P T D S t a t u t e

liability

of

101 j I. u I P HI,

i:eci p i en I ii o 1 PITma n»»111 T o t a l

recipient

1 | "J ' V

S t a t nt or y Amendments
ol

Disability

intend

had no

1" H | |J I I i' r l l U " -

following

Total

iM-nH i t i, undor

Nor

where

interpretation
nt

any P e r m a n e n t

| l i d 1 ! i HIP

IPPPIIMM

the d a t e

for

h existed

wli i li
under

n f i II j

Total
t ii

deipted
th s

t h e

HIP

Statute and.
1939.

indeed, compensation Statutes even prior to

Therefore,

Permanent

Total

there

are

Disability

Employees

injuries

who

prior

to

incurred
the

1945

Amendment who have always been entitled to - and paid lifetime Permanent Total Disability benefits.
Exhibit

"C" (R-173-175).

As indicated in the Compiler's

Notes, this Amendment, effective March 5, 1949, rewrote the
entire

Permanent

inserting

new

Total

provisions

Disability
for

Section

referral

to

42-1-63,

Rehabilitation

Division prior to a final award and then for the first time
providing

for

Employers1

Reinsurance

lifetime benefits after

compensation

Special

Fund) liability for

Fund

(now

liability of Employer/Carrier had terminated.

Surely, it

cannot be contended that this Amendment - which increases
benefits

from

a

dollar

provides for a new payer

maximum

to

lifetime

and

also

(Special Fund) of such lifetime

benefits - cannot be construed to cover Applicant's injury
even though payments had not been completed at the time of
the 1949 Amendment.

This Amendment is significant to this

case because it designates its March 5, 1949 effective date
as

being

the

date

after

which

all

Permanent

Total

Disability injuries are entitled to lifetime benefits, just
as were those injured prior to the July 1, 1945 Amendment
set forth in Exhibit "A".
Exhibit "D" (R-176-178).

This Amendment, effective July 1,

1971 is significant because it provided for the first time
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j

benefits as all other lifetime recipients who qualified for
Special
1949.

Fund
For

payments

lifetime

benefits

from and after March 5,

the first time, it provided for Special Fund
to

make

up

the

difference

between

the

interpreted

as

Employer/Carrier payments and $50,00 per week.
Certainly,

this

also

cannot

properly

be

somehow applying to anyone not receiving lifetime benefits
as of the July 1, 1974 effective date of that provision.
This Plaintiff submits that this is the basis for not only
the 1975 Amendment which increased the minimum payment but
also for the 1977 and succeeding Amendments which simply
combined
recipients

the
of

eligibility
permanent

requirements

total

disability

for

lifetime

benefits

under

legislation on and after March 5, 1949 for Special Fund
recipients and prior to that date for recipients receiving
lifetime benefits from the Employer or Carrier under any
legislation prior to the March 5, 1949 Amendatory Act which
covered all permanently and totally disabled persons on and
after that date.
7.

Exhibit "G" (R-187-189), effective May 10, 1977.
the Amendment

grasped

This is

by the Commission and, finally by

Applicants Counsel, as somehow creating lifetime benefits
where none existed before and creating a liability (in this
Fund) where none existed before.
The Title to the Act on R-188 identifies who were intended
to benefit from the new Permanent Total Disability language
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Th a t

e x: p ] a n a t i • :> n

i3 as

ac

The new language:

". . and entitled to benefits from

the

.

Special

permanently
benefits

Fund
and

from

.

."

totally

the

includes:
disabled

Special

Fund

(i)
and

persons

receiving

because

all

such

permanently and totally disabled persons after March
5, 1949 automatically by the terms of the Permanent
Total Disability

Statutes

in effect during all such

years after March 5, 1949 are entitled to Special Fund
benefits

after

payments;

and

termination

(ii) persons

of

Employer/Carrier

permanently

and

totally

disabled and entitled to and receiving benefits from
the Special Fund as a result of the 1974 Amendment
referred

to

in

Exhibit

"F"

(R-184-185)

and

its

successor Amendment in 1975 which merely increased the
minimum benefit.,
other

permanently

were not already
squares

with

It was not intended to refer to any
and

totally

receiving

disabled

persons

lifetime benefits.

the, ^title, which

correctly

who
This

states:

"Requiring/(special Fund participants, , . Finally, if the Commissions

interpretation

is accepted,

there is no need for any of the language used in the Amendment other
than to say:

"All persons permanently and totally disabled shall

receive not less than $75.00 per week when paid only by the Special
Fund or when combined with compensation payments of the Employer or
the Insurance Carrier."
There would be no need whatsoever to make the distinction
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That

neither

the

1977

Amendment

to

Permanent

Total

Disability Statute (now Section 35-1-67 Utah Code Ann.) nor
any

other

Amendment

of

the

Permanent

Total

Disability

Statute of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act was intended
to

create

new

lifetime

increased

benefits

to Applicant

Robert Seitz or to create a new 100% liability for those
lifetime

benefits

Reinsurance

in

the

Special

Fund* Plaintiff

recognized

(now Employers'

herein).

Moreover,

accepted

basic

construction,

considered

in

Amendments

that Statute, particularly

1973 and

and

Fund

to

1974 discussed

principles
the

under

of

statutory

of

previous

those

in 1971,

light

in detail hereinabove, the 1977

Amendment - considered as a whole with meaning accorded to
all

the

pertinent

language

-

cannot

reasonably

be

interpreted as found by the Commission to entitle Applicant
after

almost

30 years - to lifetime benefits which were

expressly denied to him under the Statute in effect at the
time of his injury.
established

For this reason alone - application of

principles

of

statutory

construction

-

the

Decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed
and Applicant's claim dismissed.
As a matter of established Utah Workers1 Compensation Law,

7
the

197# Amendment,

majority
1948

even

if intended

as the Commission

held, cannot properly be applied to Applicant's

injury

because

it

would

create

new

and

enlarged

benefits in Applicant as well as a new 100% liability in
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test for syphilis, made not more than thirty days prior to the date of
issuance of such license and that in the opinion of such physician and
surgeon, the applicant either is not infected with syphilis or other venereal disease, or if so infected, is not in a stage of such disease which is
or which may become communicable.
40-1-20. Medical Certificate.
The certificate and report shall be on a form to be provided
and distributed by the state board of health to approved laboratories in
the state. This form is referred to in this act as the certificate form,
provided, however, that any certificate form which has been approved by
the proper authority in any state requiring premarital examinations for
venereal diseases shall be accepted in this state.
Approved February 19,1945.

DNDDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 65
^ H. B. No. 6.

(Passed February 21,1945.- In effect July 1,1945.)

v* AMENDING SUNDRY SECTIONS OF TITLE 42, CHAPTERS 1 AND 2
AND ADDING TWO SECTIONS
An Act Amending Sections 42-1-17, 42-1-37, 42-l-39 t 42-1-41, 42-1-44,
42-1-58, 42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64, 42-1-65, 42-1-69, 42-1-75 and
42-1-83, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating to and Providing Workmen's Compensation; Places of Employment to be Safe; Penalty for
Failure to Furnish Information or Obey an Order of the Commission;
Injunctions for Failure to Insure; Employees Defined; Right of Recovery from Third Persons for Wrongful Acts; Amounts of Compensation Payable; Remarriage of Widow; Rehabilitation of Injured
Employee; Artificial Appliances and Burial Expenses; Injuries to
Minors; and Enacting New Sections to be Known as 42-1-57.10 and
42-1-69,10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating to and Providing for
Compensation in Case of Injury to Minors Illegally Employed, Penalty
and Exclusive Remedy and Defining When Minor Awards Shall Cease;
and Repealing Section 14-6-27, Utah Code Annotated 1943*
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
•••
s$— Section 1. Sections Amended.
iSf L £*t?^]
Sections 42-1-17, 42-1-37, 42-1-39, 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-58, 42-1-61,
| ^ i L « V ^ 42-1-62, 52-1-63, 42-1-64, 42-1-65, 42-1-69, 42-1-75 and 42-1-83, Utah
IsSTtt-wi J* Code Annotated 1943, are amended to read:
r | ^ 2 ^ J ! 3 • 42-1-17. Investigation^ Places of Employment.
~~ ^ Upon complaint oy any person that any employment of place of employment, regaroless of the mimoer if persons emnioyed, is not safe or is
injurious "o- zhe welfare of any emniovee, tne commission snail proceed,
with or without notice, ^o matte hucn ^vesrigation as may be necessary
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One thumb at the proximal joint
.-.
30 weeks
One thumb at the second or distal joint
„
20 weeks
One first finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
30 weeks
One first finger at the proximal joint
20 weeks
One first finger at the second joint
15 weeks
One first finger at the distal joint
10 weeks
One second finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
30 weeks
One second finger at the proximal joint
15 weeks
One second finger at the second joint
10 weeks
One second finger at the distal joint
5 weeks
One third finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
....
20 weeks
One third finger at the proximal joint
12 weeks
One third finger at the second joint
8 weeks
One third finger at the distal joint
..........
4 weeks
One fourth finger and the metacarpal bone thereof. . . . . . . .
12 weeks
One fourth finger at the proximal joint . . . . . c
9 weeks
One fourth finger at the second joint .
•
6 weeks
One fourth finger at the distal joint
......
.......
3 weeks
One leg at or so near the hip joint as to preclude the use of an
artificial limb
180 weeks
One leg at or above the knee where stump remains sufficient to
permit the use of an artificial limb
..
150 weeks
One leg between the knee and the ankle.
140 weeks
One foot at the ankle
125 weeks
One great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof
. 30 weeks
One great toe at the proximal joint
15 weeks
One great toe at the second joint
10 weeks
One toe other than the great toe with the metatarsal bone
thereof
c
12 weeks
One toe other than the great toe at the proximal joint
6" weeks
One toe other than the great toe at the distal joint
3 weeks
In the above cases permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed
equivalent to loss of the member or part thereof.
One eye by enucleation
120 weeks
Total blindness of one eye
100 weeks
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section, but not
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks. ,
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section,
and in no event shall more than a total of $5,624.00 be required to be paid.
42-1-63. Compensation for Permanent Total Disability.
In cases of permanent total disability, the award shall be 60 per cent
of the average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly wages but not to exceed a
ma-rfTTin-m oi S22.30 per week, plus 5 per cent: af such award for each

Ch. 65

Industrial Commission

[142]

dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum
of five such dependent minor children, and not less than $10.00 per
week, 'provided, however, that in no case of permanent total disability
shall more than $8,500.00 be required to be paid. The loss, or permanent
and complete loss of use, of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both
legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this
section.
• - In case the permanent total disability begins after a period of temporary total disability, the period of temporary disability shall be deducted from the total period of compensation.
42-1-64. Compensation for Death.
In case injury causes death within the period of three years, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased
as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier
shall pay into the state treasury a sum equal to 20 per cent of the amount
provided in subdivision (2) of this section. Any claim for compensation
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of the
death of the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the date of
the death of the deceased no claim for compensation shall have been filed
with the commission, the payment of a sum equal to 20-per cent of the
amount provided in subdivision (2) of this section shall be paid at that
time into the state treasury.by the employer or the insurance carrier.
Such payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes provided
in sections 42-1-65 and 42-1-66; the state treasurer shall be the custodian
of such special fund, and the commission shall direct the distribution
thereof.
: (2) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death,
the payment shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly wage, but not to
exceed a maximum of $22.50 per week to continue for the remainder of
the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years
after the date- of the injury, and shall not amount to more than a maximum of $7,000.00 or less than a minimum of $2,000.
: (3) If there are partly dependent persons at the. time of the death,
the payment shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly wages, but not
to exceed the maximum of $22.50 per week, to continue for all or such
portion of the period of six years after the date of injury as the commission in" each case may determine, and shall not amount to more than
a maximum of $5,000. The benefits provided for in this subdivision shall
be in keeping with the-'circumstances and conditions of dependency
existing at the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this subdivision i must be consistent with the general provisions of this title/, .W>""v . -r . :
- •
; .. .
_ ;i
(4) If there are'wholly, dependent persons and also partially dependent persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion" the
benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 51
S. B. No. 43.
(Passed February 23, 1930. In effect May 9,1939.)
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION—STATE
INSURANCE FUND
An Act Amending Sections 42-1-2, 42-1-5,
42-1-27, 42-1-30, 42-1-31, 42-1-34, 42-1-36,
42-1-37, 42-1-38, 42-1-39, 42-1-40, 42-1-41,
42-1-44, 42-1-46, 42-1-47, 42-1-49, 42-1-53,
42-1-54, 42-1-58, 42-1-67, 42-1-90, 42-1-91,
42-1-92, 42-1-93, 42-1-95,
42-2-1,
42-2-3,
42-2-5, 42-2-7, 42-2-11, 42-2-16 and 42-2-17
of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and
Sections 42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64
and 42-1-69 of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as Amended by Chapter 41, Laws of
Utah, 1937; and Enacting a New Section to
Be Known as Section 42-1-97A, Relating to
Industrial Commission, Workmen's Compensation and the State Insurance Fund.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Utah:
Section 1. Sections Amended and Enacted.
Sections 42-1-2, 42-1-5, 42-1-27, 42-1-30,
42-1-31, 42-1-34, 42-1-36, 42-1-37, 42-1-38, 42-1-39,
42-1-40, 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-46, 42-1-47,
42-1-49,42-1-53, 42-1-54, 42-1-58, 42-1-67, 42-1-90,
42-1-91, 42-1-92, 42-1-93, 42-1-95, 42-2-1, 42^2-3,
42-2-5, 42-2-7, 42-2-11, 42-2-16 and 42-2-17 of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and Sections
42-1-61, 42-1-62, 42-1-63, 42-1-64 and 42-1-69 of
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended
by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937, are amended
and Section 42-1-97A is enacted to read:
42-1-2.

Actions by and Against—Service of
Process on.
By its name "The Industrial Commission of
Utah" said commission may sue and be sued.
Service of summons or other process on any
member of the commission, or on the secretary
thereof, shall be deemed service on the commission.
42-1-3. Salary of Members—Oaths—Bonds.
Each commissioner shall receive an annual
salary of $4,000, payable as are other state officers. Before entering upon the duties of his
office he shall take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office, and file the same in the office of the secretary of state. Each member of
the commission shall give a corporate surety
bond in the sum of $10,000. All employees of the
commission receiving or disbursing funds of the
state shall give corporate surety bonds to :he
state in amounts and with sureties co be approved

by the commission. The bond premiums shall be
paid by the state.
42-1-27. Depositions.
The commission or any party may in any investigation cause depositions of witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken as in
civil actions.
42-1-30. Prosecutors on Behalf of Commission.
The commission may direct a representative
to act as special prosecutor or to defend in any
suit, action, proceeding, investigation, hearing or
trial relating to matters within or concerning its
jurisdiction. Upon the request of the commission, the attorney-general, district attorney or
the county attorney of the county in which any
investigation, hearing or trial had under the provisions of this title is pending, shall aid therein
and prosecute, under the supervision of the commission, all necessary actions or proceedings for
the enforcement of this title.
42-1-31.

Orders Not to Be Set Aside on
Technicalities.
A substantial compliance with the requirements of this title shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the commission, and they
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void
for any omission of a technical nature.
42-1-34.

Actions, to Set Aside Orders—Exclusive Jurisdiction of Supreme and
District Courts.
No court, except the district court and the
supreme court shall have jurisdiction to review,
vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct, amend
or annul any order of the commission requiring
protection of life, health, safety or welfare1 of
employees in any employment or places of employment, or to suspend or delay the execution
or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or
interfere with the commission in the performance
of its official duties.
42-1-36.

Proceedings Preferred on Trial
Calendars.
All actions and proceedings under this title,
and all actions or proceedings to which the commission or the state may be a party, in which
any question arises under this title, or under or
concerning any order of the commission, shall
be advanced for trial or hearing over all other
civil causes, except election and public utility
causes, irresDective of position on the calendar.
The same preference shall be granted noon aodication of the commission m any action or proceeding in wnich it may oe allowed to intervene.
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of five such dependent minor children, or $20
per week, to be paid weekly for the periods stated
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in
addition to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, to wit:
•; For loss of:
One arm at or near shoulder ...
.200 weeks
One arm at the elbow ....... ....
180 weeks
One arm between the wrist and the
elbow
160 weeks
bne hand
.150 weeks
One thumb and the metacarpal bone
thereof
60 weeks
One thumb at the proximal joint
30 weeks
One thumb at the second or distal joint 20 weeks
One first finger and the metacarpal
- bone thereof
30 weeks
One first finger at the proximal joint.. 20 weeks
One first finger at the second joint
15 weeks
One first finger at the distal joint........ 10 weeks
One second finger and the metacarpal
bone thereof ....................................... 30 weeks
One second finger at the proximal
joint
.
.............
.............. 15 weeks
One second finger at the second joint.. 10 weeks
One second finger at the distal joint.. 5 weeks
One third finger and the metacarpal
- bone thereof
20 weeks
,One third finger at the proximal joint 12 weeks
One third finger at the second joint
8 weeks
One third finger at the distal joint...! 4 weeks
. One fourth finger and the metacarpal
- bone thereof . . _
12 weeks
One fourth finger at the proximal
joint ...
,
9 weeks
One fourth finger at the second joint. 6 weeks
One fourth finger at the distal joint
3 weeks
One leg at or so near the hip joint as
to preclude the use of an artificial
limb
....
......._......180 weeks
One leg at or above the knee where
stump remains sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb.....„..150 weeks
One leg between the knee and ankle....!40 weeks
- One foot at the ankle
.
....125 weeks
One great toe with the metatarsal
bone thereof
......... 30 weeks
One great toe at the proximal joint... 15 weeks
One great toe at the second joint....... 10 weeks
One toe other than the great toe with
the metatarsal bone thereof . ...
12 weeks
One toe other than the great toe at
the proximal joint
..
6 weeks
One toe other than the great toe at the
distal joint ................
.
3 weeks
In the above cases permanent and complete
loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of
the member or part thereof.
One eye by enucleation.
120 weeks
Total blindness of one eye
100 weeks
For any other disfigurement or the loss of
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bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable and in proportion to
compensation in other cases, not exceeding two
hundred weeks.
The amounts specified in this section are all
subject to the limitations as to the maximum
' weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a total of
$6,250 be required to be paid.
42-1-63.

Compensation for Permanent Total
Disability.
In cases of permanent total disability, the
award shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly
wages for five yeara from date of injury, and
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly
wages until the death of such person so totally
disabled, but not to exceed a maximum of $16
per week, plus 5 per cent of such award for
each dependent minor child under the age of
eighteen years, up to a maximum of five such
dependent minor children, and not less than $7
per week. The loss, or permanent and complete
loss of use. of both hands or both arms, or both
feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two
thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this section.
42-1-64. Compensation for Death.
In case injury causes death within the period
of three years, the employer or insurance carrier
shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as
provided herein, and further benefits in the
amounts and to the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer
and insurance carrier shall pay into the state
treasury a sum equal to 20 per cent of the amount
provided in subdivision (2) of this section. Any
claim for compensation must be filed with the
commission within one year from the date of
the death of the deceased, and, if at the end of
one year from the date of the death of the deceased no claim for compensation shall have been
filed with the commission, the payment of a sum
equal to 20 per cent of the amount provided in
subdivision (2) of this section shall be paid at
that time into the state treasury by the employer
or the insurance carrier. Such payment shall be
held in a special fund for the purposes provided
in sections 42-1-65 and 42-1-66; the state treasurer shall be the custodian of 3uch special fund,
and the commission shall direct the distribution
thereof.
(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment shall be 60
per cent of the average weekly wage, but sot to
exceed a maximum of $16 per week, plus 10 per
cent of said award for each dependent minor
child under the age of eighteen years, up to and
including five such dependent minor children, to
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42-1-65, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries.
IV. The benefits imposed upon the employer and to which an employee
found, as in this section above provided, to be partially permanently disabled, shall be entitled under this act, are limited to the following:
During those weeks in which the employee is actively in training under
the division of rehabilitation, as in this section above referred to, the
employee shall receive §25.00 per week for not to exceed 10 weeks, or a
total of §250.00, such payment to be made at four-week intervals and
upon the filing with the commission at two-week intervals of a certificate by the division of rehabilitation that the employee is cooperating with
such division in his rehabilitation training.
At the termination of such training in rehabilitation, the employee
shall be paid §12.50 a week at four-week intervals until such time as the
total payments so made, plus the weekly payments received by the employee during rehabilitation training, equals a sum equivalent to that
amount determined under the following formula:
By applying the percentage of partial permanent disability resulting
from the occupational disease and determined by the medical panel (or
in case of formal hearing, then by the commission) to the amount of
§3000.00. For example: Assume a finding by the medical panel that the
employee has sustained partial permanent disability from an occupational disease to the extent of 20 fo loss of bodily function. 20fo of
$3000.00 equals §600.00. The amount payable would therefore be:
10 weeks rehabilitation
§250.00
Balance at intervals of 4 weeks
350.00
TOTAL
§600.00
Notwithstanding anything hereinabove provided, payments for partial permanent disability shall not exceed in any one case an aggregate of
Three Thousand Dollars (§3000.00) and all payments so made shall be
credited to the employer and deducted from any award which might
ultimately be made should the employee subsequently become totally and
permanently disabled.
Section 3. Section Repealed.
Sec. 42-1A-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by chapter 66,
Laws of Utah 1945, is repealed.
Section 4. Effective Date.
This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved March 5, 1949.

CHAPTER 52
5. B. No. 2S9.

(Passed February 28,1949. In effect Marca 5,1949.)

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
i n Act Amending Section 42-1-40, 42-1-57, 42-1-79, Utah Code Annotated 1943; 42-1-41, 42-1-44, 42-1-61, 42-1-62, -42-1-63, 42-1-64 and
42-1-75, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as Amended by Chapter 65, Laws

Ch. 52

Industrial Commission

[106]

One third finger at the distal joint
4 weeks
One fourth finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
12 weeks
One fourth finger at the proximal joint
9 weeks
One fourth finger at the second joint
6 weeks
One fourth finger at the distal joint
3 weeks
One leg at or near the hip joint as to preclude the use of
an artificial limb
180 weeks
One leg at or above the knee where stump remains sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb
150 weeks
One leg between the knee and ankle
140 weeks
One foot at the ankle
125 weeks
One great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof
30 weeks
One great toe at the proximal joint
15 weeks
One great toe at the second joint
10 weeks
One toe other than the great toe with the metatarsal bone
thereof
.
12 weeks
One toe other than the great toe at the proximal joint
6 weeks
One toe other than the great toe at the distal joint
3 weeks
In the above cases permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed
equivalent to loss of the member or part thereof.
One eye by enucleation
120 weeks
Total blindness of one eye"
100 weeks
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided fcr herein, such period of compensation as the commission
shall deem equitable andl in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section,
and in no event shall more than a total of $6250.00 be required to be paid.
42-1-63- Id. For Permanent Total Disability.
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the
average weekly stages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of
$25*00 per week and not less than $15.00 per week, plus 5% of such award
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a
maximum of 5 such dependent minor children; provided however, that
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay more than $11,000.00; and provided further,
that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission
of Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it
shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section
42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, subdivision 1, not to
exceed $520.00 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
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ployee; the rehabilitation and training: of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 42-1-65, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, and relating to the rehabilitation of employees
having combined injuries. If and when the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial
commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully cooperated
with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate
him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehablitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of his average weekly earnings,
but not to exceed $25.00 per week, out of that special fund provided for
by section 42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, for such
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in* this
section provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier
terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee,
however, shall be entitled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to
cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth
herein.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained' a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both*feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according:
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases,
hcnoever, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial
permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for an}'
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in
excess of ?11,000.00.
42-1-64. Id. Death.
In case injury causes death within the period of three years, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and to
the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier
shall pay into the state treasury the sum of Eighteen Hundred Dollars.
Any claim for compensation must be filed with the commission within
one year from the date of the death of the deceased, and, if at the end of
one year from the date of the death of the deceased no claim for compensation shall have been filed with the comntission, the said sum of Eighteen
Hundred Dollars shall be paid at that rane into the state treasury by
the employer or the insurance c^«ie*r Such payment shall be held in a
special fund for the purposes%rovided in this title; the state treasurer
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CHAPTER 76
S. B. No. 242

(Passed March 10, 197!

In effect July 1, 1971)

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
An Act Amending Sections 35-1-5 and 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated
1953, Section 35-1-53, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by
Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66, 35-1-67, and
35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws
of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as
Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah
1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of
Utah 1969, Section 35-1-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended
by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, and Section 35-1-81, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as
Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter
68, Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah
1969, Repealing and Reenacting Section 35-1-75, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and Repealing Section 35-1-61, Utah Code Annotated
1953; Relating to Workmen's Compensation; Deleting the Provision
Relating to Compensation of Commissioners; Deleting the Additional
Tax on Employers Authorized to Pay Compensation Direct; Establishing the Amounts to be Paid by Every County, City, Town, or School
District Which Elects to Pay Compensation Direct; Providing for the
Deduction of Costs and Attorney's Fees From the Person Paying Compensation Upon Recovery From a Third Person; Providing Increased
Benefits; Establishing the Period of Compensation for Permanent Total
Loss of Bodily Function; Providing Additional Compensation for Persons Totally and Permanently Disabled Who Are Receiving Benefits
From the Special Fund; Providing for the Protecting of Payments to
Minor Dependents; Providing a New Method of Determining Average
Weekly Wage; Repealing the Penalty for Illegal Employment of
Minors; Providing an Effective Date.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 35-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read:
35-1-5.

Commissioner to take oath of office and give a corporate surety
bond.

Each commissioner, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall
take and subscribe the constitutional oath of office, and file the same
in the office of the secretary of state. Each member of the commission
shall give a corporate surety bond in such amount and in such form as
shell [shall] be determined by the department of finance. All employees
of the commission receiving or disbursing funds of the state shall give
corporate surety bonds to the state in such amount and in such form as
snail be determined by the department oi finance. The bond premiums
shall be paid by the state.
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than industrial conditions.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical
professions appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each
eai at the three frequencies 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second which
shall be added together and divided by three to determine the average
decibel loss. To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the
'average decibel loss % of decibel for each year of the employee's age
over forty at the time of the accident: To determine the percentage of
hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction of the loss in decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding fifteen decibels shall be multiplied by 1%% up to the maximum of 100%
which is reached at 82 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of
hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resultant figure
is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent
partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter* Where an employee files one
or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously
found,to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or
100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not
exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period
of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section,
and in no event shall more than a total of 312 weeks in compensation
be required to be paid*
Section 6. Section amended.
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
57, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of
as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended
65, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of
is amended to read:

by Chapter
Utah 1957,
by Chapter
Utah 1963,
by Chapter
Utah 1969,

35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation
—Maximum benefit,
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that
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in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68,
not to exceed S890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that
there-be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided)
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at
the rate of $44 per week This section shall apply to all persons permanently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases,
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any
combination ox disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in
excess of 524.348.
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Section 1. Section amended.
Sectioi i '!; i 1 16, \ Ital i Code V mot a.ted 1953, is amended to i sad:
35-1 16,

Powers and duties of the industrial commission.

It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall have full, power,
jurisdiction and authority:
(1) To supervise every employment and place of employment and to
administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety
and welfare of employees.
(2) To ascertain and fix such reasonable standards, and prescribe,
modify and enforce such reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards and other means or methods of protection, to be as
nearly uniform as possible, as may be necessary to carry out all laws and
lawful orders relative to the protection of the life, health, safety and
welfare of employees in employment and places of employment.
(3) To ascertain, fix and order such reasonable standards for the
construction, repair and maintenance of places of employment as shall
render them safe.
(4) To investigate, ascertain and determine such reasonable classifications of persons, employments and places of employment as shall be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this title.
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation
of disputes between employers and employees.
(6) To establish and conduct free employment agencies, and to license,
supervise and regulate private employment offices, and to bring together
employers seeking employees and working people seeking employment,,
and to make known the opportunities for employment in this state.
(7) To collect, collate and publish statistical and other information
relating to employees, employers, employments and places of employment
and such other statistics as it may deem proper.
(8) To ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and regulations, to
proscribe and enforce reasonable orders, and to take such other actions
as may be appropriate for the protection of life, health, safety and welfare
of all persons with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut
workings, quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills and surface operations
or any olher mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer and employee exists.
Approved March 15, 1973.

CHAPTER 67
S.U. \ 0 . 7 7
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In effect July t. 19 V\\

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
An Aci VifTiei-K ling: Section, 35-1 84, 1 Jtah Code Annotated 1953, as Amend-
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ed by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws
of Utah 1965, Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66, 35-1-67, and 35-1-68, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as
Amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter S5,
Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as
Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68,
Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as
Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76,
Laws of Utah 1971, Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62,
Laws of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as
Amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68,
Laws of Utah 1965, as Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 76,
Laws of Utah 1971, and Section 35-1-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
Amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76,
Laws of Utah 1971;'Relating to Workmen's Compensation; Reducing the
Waiting Period for Benefits; Providing Increased Benefits Based Upon
State Average Weekly Wage; Defining State Average Weekly Wage;
Extending the Time Within Which to File Claim for Compensation; Extending Statutes of Limitation; Increasing the Credit of Social Security
Against Compensation payments; providing Increased Payments for
Rehabilitation; Providing for maximum Attorneys' Fees Payable by Employers or Their Carriers in, and for Notice to those Persons Prior to, any
Action Against a Third Party; Limiting Widows1 Lump Sum Benefits;
and Providing an Effective Date.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 35-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 71,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
35-1-64. Waiting period for benefits.
No. compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury
is received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical,
nurse and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses,
provided, however, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more
than 14 days, compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is received.
Section 2.

Section amended.

Section 35-1-65, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amen
ded by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959^ as amended by Chapter 71, Laws o
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended b}
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utal
1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chap
ter 76, Laws of Utah 1971* is amended to read:
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at the three frequencies 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second which shall be
added together and divided by three to determine the average decibel loss.
To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel
loss 1/2 a decibel for each year of the employee's age over forty at the time
of the accident; To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction of the loss in decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel loss
for each decibel of loss exceeding fifteen decibels shall be multiplied by 11/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 82 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing
loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits
as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims for
hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall be
deducted from any subsequent aware by the commission. In no event shall
compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall
deem equitable and in proporation as near as may be to compensation for
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation
for permanent total loss of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as
to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in
no event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
Section 4

Section amended.

Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, Laws of
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah
1967, as amended by Chapter 86y Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read:
35-1 67

Permanent total disability— Limitation of weekly compensation—Referral procedures to division of vocational rehabilitation—-Partial permanent disability— Statutes of limitations.

In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66-2/3%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a
maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a
dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to
exceed 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
p e r W eek. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the em-
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ployer or its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation
payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been tound to be permanently ana
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not to
exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee;
the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the
practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation
of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the
industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such employee has fully
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be
rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66-2/3% of his average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a
minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each
dependent*minor child under the age of IS years, up to a maximum of four
such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special
fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning
with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by
the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational
rehabilitation as set forth herein.
Commencing July l f 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall be
paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of
Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard,
determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation,
sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in
sections 35-1-65. 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function , in ex-
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cess of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week for 312 weeks.
Section 5. Section amended.
Section 354.53^ Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 5 7,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, Laws of
Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by
Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah
1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as amended by Chapter 78 L«i *vs of Utah 1971, is amended to read:
35-1-68. Death benefits—Dependents— Special fund.
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses
of the deceased as provided herein, and further benefits in the amounts and
to the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier shall
pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of death of
the deceased, and, i»f at the end of one year from the date of death of the
deceased, no claim for compensation shall have been filed with the commission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid at that time into the state
treasury by the employer or the insurance carrier. This payment shall be
reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or
due the deceased between the date of the accident and his death. Such
payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes provided in this
title; the state treasurer shall be the custodian of such special fund, and the
commission shall direct the distribution thereof.
(2) If there are wholly dependent-persons at the time of the death, the
payment shall be 66-2/3% of the 'decedent's average weekly wage at the time
of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum
of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent
minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for
the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to exceed
six years-or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(3) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the
payment shall be 66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wages at the
time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a
minimum of $35 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may determine
and shall not amount to more than a maximum of $15,600. The benefits
provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances
and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and any amount
awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consistent with
the general provisions of this cide.
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LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CHAPTER 13
S. B. No. 3

(Passed February l f 1974. In effect April 4, 1974)

BENEFITS FOR PERSONS PERMANENTLY
DISABLED BEFORE 1949
An Act Amending Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter 57, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62, Laws
of Utah 1957, as Amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as Amended by Chapter 49,
Laws of Utah 1963, as Amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as
Amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1967, as Amended by Chapter
86, Laws of Utah 1969, as Amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971,
as Amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1973, Relating to Permanent
and Total Disability Benefits Under Workmen's Compensation; Providing for Payment of $50 per Week to Such Persons Regardless of
When Such Disability Occurred.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter
57, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957,
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter
71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963,
as amended by Chapter 68t Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter
65, Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969,
as amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter
67, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read:
35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits.
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66
2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week
plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury per week However, in no case of permanent total
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay such
weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided
further, that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability
shall in all cases be tentative and not iinai until such time as the following
proceedings have been nad:
Where the employee has Tentatively 3een ;ouna co oe uermanentiv and
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totally disabled, it shall be manditory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and It sLall
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1),
not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such
employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 66 2/3 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus
$5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week out of that special fund provided for by section 351-63(1), for such period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the employer or its
insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee.
No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails
or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as
set forth herein.
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week.
Commencing July 1,1974, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) at a
rate sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with
employer or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, \at Jhe termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity
to be heard, determine whether the empio3/ee ha^ notwithstanding such
rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function!'
The loss or permanent and complete loss of ase of both hands or both
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arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 66 2/3 % of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week for 312 weeks.
Approved February 8, 1974.

MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 14
H. B. No. 3

(Passed February 2, 1974. In effect April 4, 1974)

REGISTRATION FEES ON FARM TRUCKS
An Act Amending Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As Enacted by Chapter 66, Laws of Utah 1955, as Amended by Chapter 62,
Laws of Utah 1959, as Amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1963, as
Amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1973; Relating to Registration Fees for Motor Vehicles, Providing for a Separate Schedule of
Registration Fees for Farm Trucks,
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter
66, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1959,
as amended by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by Chapter
75, Laws of Utah 1973, is amended to read:
41-1-127,

Registration fees—Schedule.

There shall be paid to the department for the registration of every
motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer or semitrailer, at the time
application is made for registration:
(a) A registration fee :>i 32.50 for :he registration of every motorcycle or trailer of 750 oounas or :ess uniaaen *veignt.
'b)

A registration ;ee )r 35.00 .or iie registration or -every iiotor

EXHIBIT "G
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If any deduction is made from the wages paid, the employer shall, either
semimonthly or monthly at the employer's option, furnish the employee
with a statement showing the total amount of each deduction, provided that
only one total need be shown to include all standing deductions of fixed
amounts, unless otherwise agreed by employer and employee.
Approved March 19, 1977.

CHAPTER 156
H. B. No. 297

(Passed March 10, 1977. In effect May 10, 1977)

AMENDMENTS TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 35-1-7, 35-1-41 AND 35-1-56, UTAH CODE.
ANNOTATED 1953, SECTION 35-1-83, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, SECTION 35-1-74, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF UTAH 1963,
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 68, I<AWS OF UTAH 1965, SECTION 35-1-46, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF UTAH 1969,
SECTION 35-1-75, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 76,
LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1975,
SECTION 35-1-66, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957,
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY
CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961, AS AMENDED. BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF
UTAH 1963, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 68, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, AS AMENDED
BY CHAPTER 65, LAWS OF UTAH 1967, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF
UTAH 1969, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 76, LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED
BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF UTAH 1973, SECTION 35-1-67, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
55, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH 1961,
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 49, LAWS OF UTAH 1963, AS AMENDED BY
CHAPTER 68, LAWS OF UTAH 1965, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 65, LAWS OF
UTAH 1967, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 86, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, AS AMENDED
BY CHAPTER 76, LAWS OF UTAH 1971, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 67, LAWS OF
UTAH 1973, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 13, LAWS OF UTAH 1974, AS AMENDED
BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1975, SECTION 35-1-68, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 57, LAWS OF UTAH 1955, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 62, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, A3 AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1959, AS AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER ~1, LAWS OF UTAH 1361,
AS AMENDED 3Y J H A P ^ R % ^ A W S 3F 'JTAH s963, iS T E N D E D 3Y
CHAPTER S3. LAWS I F UTAH .365, *S AMENDED 3Y JHAPT2R ^5. L^WS OF
fJTAH ,967. AS AMENDED 6Y CHAPTER S6. ,JAWS OF T JTAH :269. AS AMENDED
3Y CHAPTER 76, Z ^ ^ S OF 'JTAH ,371. ^ S ^MENDED BY CHAPTER 67. L A W S OF
JTAH 973. AS AMENDED 3Y JIIAPTSR 91. ^AWS ")F JTAH 375. AND
SECTION -35-1-31, JTAH JODE .-ANNOTATED '953. -*3 AMENDED 3Y J H A P ^ R
57, LAWS OF UTAH .955, .\S AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER '32. LAWS OF TJTAH 1957,
AS AMENDED 3Y JHAPT3R 58. InWS OF JTAH 965, AS AMENDED 3Y
CHAPTER 36, LAWS OF UTAH 1969, A S AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75. LAWS OF
UTAH .971, AS AMENDED 3Y CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 1973, \ND

Ch« 156

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

[676]

REPEALING SECTION 35-1-48, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; RELATING TO
THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; BRINGING CURRENT LAWS
INTO CONFORMITY WITH PRESENT PRACTICE; CORRECTING EAZUJER
OMISSIONS; PROVIDING THAT PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES SHALL BE EY
EMPLOYERS AND NOT THEIR INSURANCE COMPANIES; REQUIRING A
REVIEW OF DEPENDENCY WHEN APPLYING FOR A CONTINUATION OF
BENEFITS, ALLOWING A ROUNDING TO THE NEAREST DOLLAR OF THE
WEEKLY COMPENSATION RATE; REQUIRING MINIMUM BENEFITS FOR ALL
SPECIAL FUND PARTICIPANTS; AND REQUIRING ALL ENTITIES TO SECURE
COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYEES UNDER THE SAME OPTIONS; AND
MAKING CHANGES REGARDING PROVIDING ARTIFICIAL MEANS OR
APPLIANCES AND BURIAL EXPENSES.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section I. Section amended.
Section 35-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read:
35-1-7.

Office at Salt Lake City—Sessions at any place.

The commission shall keep its office [at the otato capitol] in Salt Lake
City, and shall be furnished necessary rooms and office furniture; but the
commission may hold sessions in any place within the state.
Section 2. Section amended.
Section 35-1-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read:
35-1-41. Furnishing information to commission—Employers' annual
report—Rights of commission—Examination of employers under oath
—Penalties.
Every employer shall furnish the commission, upon request, all
information required by it to carry out the purposes of this title. In the
month of July of each year every employer shall prepare and mail to the
commission [at the—state capitol] a statement containing the following
information, viz: The number of persons employed during the preceding
year from July 1, to June 30, inclusive; the number of such persons
employed at each kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each class
of employment, showing the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the
aggregate amount of wages paid to all employees; which information shall
be furnished on blanks to be prepared by the commission and furnished
employers free of charge upon request therefor. Every employer shall cause
such blanks to be properly filled out so as to answer fully and correctly all
questions therein propounded, and shall give all the information therein
sought, or, if unable to do so, he shall give to the commission, in writing,
good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commission may require
the information herein required to be furnished to be made under oath and
returned to ;he commission within the penoG fixea by :t or by '.aw. The
commission. >r my member ;hereor\ or any person emoioyed ay the
commission ror :hat purpose, .mail have the rigta 'o examine, under oath,
any employer, a is agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any
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For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission ehall
deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation
for permanent total loss of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section,
and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in
compensation be required to be paid.
Section 6. Section amended.
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67,
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 13, Laws of Utah 1974, as
amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, is amended to read:
35-1-67, Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66
2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent [wife] spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under
the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time
of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury per week. However, in no case of permanent total
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay
such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and
provided further, that a finding by the commission of permanent total
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as the
following proceedings have been had: Where
the
employee, has
tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to
the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to
order paid :o such vocational rsnanilitation division, out: of that special
fund provided for by section 35- L—58 (1), not to exceed 31,000 for ase in the
rehabilitation ana ".raining )f iucn ^mnioyee; ;he rehabilitation ana
training oi sucn employee mail generally totlow the practice applicable
under section 35-'i.-o9, and-relating no che rehabilitation >i employees
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having combined injuries. If and when the division of vocational
rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial
commission of Utah and in writing that such employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be
rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such
employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of his average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent [-wile] spouse
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years,
up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section
provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and
ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be
entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.
[Commencing July 1, 1071, all persona who are permanently and totally
dioablod and on that date or prior' thereto were receiving compenoation
benefito from the special-fand provided for by ooction 35 1 68 (1) ohall be
paid compensation benofito at the rate of $60 per week.]
[Commencing July 1,1075, all poroono who were permanently and totally
dioablod on or before March 5, 1040, and wore receiving compenoation
benefito and continue to receive ouch benefito ohall bo paid eompenontion
benofito from the opeeial fund provided for by ocction 35 1 68 (1) at a rate
oufficiont to bring their—weekly—benefit—to $60—when—eombincd with
employer or insurance carrier compensation paymonto.]
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to
benefits from the special fund designated in subsection (1) of section 35-1-68
including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not leas than $75
per week when paid only by the special fund, or when combined with
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial
commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an
opportunity to be heard, determine whether
the
employee
has,
notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The .oss )r oermanem; and :ompiexe 'oss of use JI both hands 3r both
arms, or zozh :eec or ootn legs, jr ootn eyes, :r of any :wo :heraoi\ snail
institute "ocai ina oermanent aisaoiiity, -o oe comuensated iccorainj? :o
:ne provisions u :nis iection ma io :entaave ;:naing oi permanent
:otai lisaoiiity snail 3e -eauirea ,n oucn nstances; n id xher :ases.

Ch. 156

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

[6841

however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but when
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial
permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided
in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in
excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week for 312 weeks.
Section 7. Section amended.
Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67,
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, is
amended to read:
35-1-68. Injury causing death—Burial expenses—Filing claim within
one year—Payment into state treasury when no dependents—Special
fund—No dependents—Payments to dependents.
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the date
of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial
expenses of the deceased as provided [heroin] in section 35-1-81, and further
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier
shall pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for
compensation must be filed with the commission within one year from the
date of death of the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the
date of death of the deceased, no claim for compensation shall have been
filed with the commission, the said sum of $15,600 shall be paid at that time
into the state treasury by the employer or the insurance carrier. This
payment shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation
payments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident
and his death. Such payment shall be held in a special fund for the purposes
provided in this title; the state treasurer shall be the custodian of such
special fund, and the commission shall direct the distribution thereof. If
the commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of
the deceased, it may order the employer or insurance carrier to pay into
the state treasury the sum specified in this subsection to be held in that
special fund for a period of one year from the death of the deceased. Any
claim filed within that year for which an award is made by the
commission ahall be paid out of the sum aeuosited Dy the emolover or
insurance currier )eiore my >%jrtner :iaim r.ay ^e issercea against
\ne ^moiovpr jr nsurance :arr:er.

EXHIBIT "H"

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

ROBERT L. SEI7Z,

Ex. 'H'

y ^ ^ > - ^ ^ ^
Applicant,
0 H D

vs«

U

UTAH FUEL COMPANY,
Defendant,

Baeed on the r o o o r d s and f i l e s of t h e CcTraisrion
and t h e a d m i s s i o n s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , i t appears t h a t Hobert
S o i t z , t h e above named a p p l i c a n t 7ms i n j u r e d by a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g
o u t of or in t h e course of h i s employment by the Utah Fuel Company
on J u l y 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 , in which he s u s t a i n e d t h e l o s s of b o t h len;s
abo^-e t h e Icneos, t h e r e b y s u f f e r i n g permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y ;
and i t f u r t h e r a p p e a r i n g t h a t Robert £ e i t z i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e
raaxirauE araourt of £8500,00 f o r -permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y c o v e r i n g t h e l o s s of b o t h l e ^ s , as p r o v i d e d by S e c t i o n 4 2 - 1 - 5 3 , Utah
Code Annotated 1 9 4 3 , as * amended 1945; t h a t a p p l i c a n t has t h r e e
minor d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n , * Richard A l l e n S e i t z , t o r n August 5 f
1942; B e t t y C a r o l S e i t z , b o r n liarch 1 4 , 1944 and Helen l & r i e S e i t z ,
b o r n May 1945, w h i c h e n t i t l e s him t o a -maximum payment of $22*50
p e r week, p l u s 5?J f o r each minor d e p e n d e n t c h i l d , or a t o t a l of
$25,88 rper Treek.
KOT TCTTTFOPJS, IT IS O^ERSD, t h a t Utah Fuel Co-pany
p/iy t o Robert S e i t z , a l l radical and h o s p i t a l expenses i n c u r r e d ,
and c o m p e n s a t i o n a t t h e rat© of -$25.88 p e r week, u n t i l the amount
of $ 8 5 0 0 . 0 0 has been p a i d .
IT IS FURTHER OBPEEED t h * t s u i t a b l e a r t i f i c i a l
be f u r n i s h e d t h e a p p l i c a n t a t the p r o p e r t i j s e .
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August 25, 1948

• '* ' •

Industrial Commission of Utah
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Gentlemen:
On July 28, 1943, Robert Seitz was injured in
the coixrse of his employment by Utah Fuel Company at
the company's mine at Sunnyside* The injury resulted
in the loss of both legs* We therefore admit liability
for the maximum amount due for permanent total disability
as provided by Utah Code Annotated 1943 as amended,
42-1-63,
Mr* Seitz has three dependent children as siiown
on o\ir first report of injury*
We will be glad to • have you enter an s?/ard in
accordance with the foregoing*
Very truly yours,

(Signed) C. £. HENDERSON

CEII: 3KM
cc:

Mr. R o b e r t S e i t z
Surm.y3idc, Utah

feXHJBIT NO.

EXHIBIT

"I"

trx. x
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 90000685
ROBERT ^. SEITZ,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*
*

ORDER

*

UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL,
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
•

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This case presents the legal issue of the effect to be given
the May 10, 1977 amendment to §35-1-67 by the Legislature.
The applicant sustained the loss of both legs above the knees
in a traumatic amputation as the result of an industrial accident
with Utah Fuel on July 28, 1948.
The employer in accordance with
the statute in effect on the date of the accident paid the
applicant their statutory maximum liability of $8,500 for the
applicant's statutory total disability. Thereafter, the employer
created a dispatcher position for the applicant and the applicant
was able to remain employed with the defendant until his retirement
in February 1976 at age 64.
On July 9, 1990 the applicant filed his claim for permanent
total disability benefits alleging the same would be due and owing
from the Employers Reinsurance Fund since the employer had
satisfied its legal liability in this matter. The ERF responded
with a denial of the claim on the grounds that the law in effect on
the date of the applicant's controls the applicant's entitlement to
permanent total disability benefits, and that law only provided for
an award of $8,500 from the employer, with no provision for ERF
involvement or liability for continuing benefits. By contrast,
applicant contends that the amendment of May 10, 1977 does provide
for ERF liability for continuing benefits to the applicant for his
statutory permanent total disability. That amendment provides as
follows:
All persons who are permanently and
totally disabled and anxii-lad oc
benefits from one special fund
designated in sucsec^ion ^1] or
section
35-L-68
^nciuaina Ariose
irrured prior :o larcn i. 19^9.
sna^Ll receive not: less or.an 375 per
weeK ^hen oaia oniv ov one special

ROBERT J- SEITZ
ORDER
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fund,
or
when
combined
with
compensation payment of the employer
or the insurance carrier, (emphasis
supplied)
In view of the foregoing statutory language and the beneficent
purpose of the Workers Compensation Act, it would appear to the
Administrative Law Judge that the Legislature specifically intended
to include applicant and others similarly situated on the Employers
Reinsurance Fund (fnka "Special Fund") permanent total disability
payroll.
Otherwise, to take the approach urged by the Fund, the
applicant would have only been entitled to receive $8,500 for the
statutory permanent total disability sustained as the result of the
industrial accident, and no other benefits.
Apparently as the
result of the inadequacy and injustice of the provisions for
permanent total benefits for those injured before March 6, 1949,
the Legislature amended the Act to include those previously left
outside the scope of §67, By so doing the Legislature corrected an
injustice and insured that all permanent total disability claimants
would be treated equally, especially considering that workers
compensation is the applicant's exclusive remedy for his tragic
injury.
Therefore, I find that pursuant to §3 5-1-67 as amended May 10,
1977 that the applicant is entitled to receive statutory permanent
total disability benefits from the ERF at the statutory minimum
rate of $75 per week commencing effective May 10, 1977.
Subsequently, the Legislature has from time to time increased the
statutory minimum rate for permanent total disability, which
increases shall also apply to applicant's benefits.
The applicant has also had the benefit of legal counsel in
this matter, who has conducted extensive legal and record research
on applicant's behalf. Counsel has requested a fee of 15% of the
award generated pursuant to Rule 16, which was in effect on the
date of the industrial injury.
I find that the fee under the
circumstances of this case is reasonable with the limitation that
the 15% shall be of the orincisai sum awarded and shall not include

ROBERT J. SEITZ
ORDER
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Robert J. Seitz is statutorily permanently and totally
disabled as the result of the industrial accident of July 28, 1948,
and pursuant to §3 5-1-67 as amended May 10, 1977 Mr. Seitz is
entitled to permanent total benefits at the statutory minimum rate
from the ERF for as long as he shall live.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund
place Robert J. Seitz on the permanent total disability payroll
effective May 10, 1977 with payments to be made at the statutory
minimum rate of $75 per week, with such subsequent increases as
have mandated by the Legislature in amendments to §67. Accrued
amounts shall be due in a lump sum and shall include interest of 8%
per annum from May 17, 1977.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund pay
Virginius Dabney, attorney for applicant, 15% of the principal
award (i.e. exclusive of interest) accrued as of the date hereof,
the same to deducted from the aforesaid award to the applicant and
remitted directly to his office.

ROBERT J. SEITZ
ORDER
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final
not subject to review or appeal.

0- M^

Allen
Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah,
this 21 day of May, 1991.
ATTEST:

Patricia O. Ashb^___^^Z
Commission Secretary

the
the
and
and

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on May 21, 1991, a copy of the attached
Order in the case of Robert J. Seitz was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Robert J. Seitz
P.O. 146
Sunnyside, UT 8453 9
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
350 south 400 E., #202
SLC, Utah 84111
Erie Boorman
ERF

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

T^^C^i^--^^

Wilma Burrows

EXHIBIT "J

tx, J
ERIE V. BOORMAN, Administrator
EMPLOYERS* REINSURANCE FUND
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P. 0. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Telephone: (801) 530-6820

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

ROBERT L. SEITZ,
Applicant,
vs.
UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL and THE
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
"*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*

Case No. 90000685

*

Defendant Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) files this Motion for Review
of

the

Order

issued

by

Presiding

Law

Judge, Timothy C. Allen,

in the

above-entitled matter on May 21, 1991.
1.

As a matter of law - Applicant has no Workers' Compensation rights
against ERF or against his Employer Utah Fuel (Kaiser Coal) arising
out of his industrial injury of July 28, 1948:
A.

Applicant's permanent total disability benefits are
determined
and
limited by the provisions and
parameters of the Permanent Total Disability Statute
in effect on the July 28, 1948, date of his
industrial injury. That Statute is Section 42-1-63,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943 as amended 1945 (attached
hereto as Exhibit A ) . In brief, Section 42-1-63 was
amended in 1945 to eliminate the lifetime permanent
total disability liability of the employer and
replace it with a maximum benefit of $8,500.00. That
provision - all parties have agreed - was in effect
and was applicable to Applicant's industrial injury
of July 23, 1948.

3.

Applicant's employer acknowledged his injury
7/23/48 as a permanent -otal disability injury and

of

requested an Order from the Industrial Commission.
(Attached as Exhibit B).
C.

On August 27, 1948, the Industrial Commission issued
its
Order
awarding
Applicant
permanent
total
disability benefits in accordance with 42-1-63, as
amended 1945, i.e., $25.88 per week, effective
7/28/48 until the Statutory maximum of $8,500.00 had
been paid.
(Attached as Exhibit C). There is no
dispute that the Order was paid in full by the
employer.
All

of

controversy.

the

above

First,

combine

we

have

to constitute
a

Statute

the Crux of this

which

clearly

defines

Permanent Total Disability, the amount of weekly benefits to which
the disabled employee is entitled and the limitation or endpoint of
those benefits, i.e., when the maximum of $8,500.00 has been paid.
Secondly, we have an employee who qualifies for the full amount of
those permanent total disability benefits, as well as an employer
who acknowledges the injury and the Applicant's eligibility benefits
under the Statute and requests an Order to that effect from the
Commission.

Third, we have an Order from the Commission setting

forth Applicant's eligibility for benefits, the exact amount per
week

to

be

paid

by

the

employer

and

the maximum

amount

of

compensation to which the applicant was entitled under the Statute.
Finally, we have full acknowledgment that the employer paid and the
Applicant received the maximum compensation set forth in the Statute
and Ordered by the Commission.
When

that

amount

was

received,

Applicant's

rights

to

compensation under the Statute and Utah Workers' Compensation Law
ceased

and

che

ampioyer's

likewise came to an and-

compensation

liability under the

Xct

In 3horr the compensation case *as closed.

9

2

Statutory and Utah Case Authority:
A.

Applicable Statute:
The only Statute pertinent to
the rights and liabilities of Applicant and E3F in
this controversy is Section 42-1-63 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, as amended 1945, set forth above and
found in Exhibit A, attached. That Section, all have
agreed, was the Permanent Total Disability Statute in
effect on the date of Applicant's industrial injury,
July
28,
1948.
It
sets
forth
Applicant's
compensation rights clearly; likewise it establishes
definitely the permanent total disability maximum
liability of defendants, i.e., "provided however,
that in no case of permanent total disability shall
more than $8,500.00 be required to be paid.** That
language was explicitly inserted because it deleted
completely the former lifetime payment language
"until
the death
of
such person so totally
disabled." It remained in effect as to all injuries
occurring between its effective date July 1, 1945 and
until the Section was rewritten effective March 5,
1949.

B.

Case Authority:
It is established Utah Workers'
Compensation Law that one is entitled to have his
rights determined on the basis of the law as it
existed at the time of the occurrence, and that a
later Statute or amendment should not be applied in a
retroactive manner to deprive a party of his rights
or impose greater liability upon him.
Okland
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d
208, 209 (1974); Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 740 P. 2d 305, 308 where the following
language is found:
la Workers' Compensation cases, rights and
liabilities are determined as of the date the injury
occurred . . . . (cases cited) . . . Later Statutes
or amendments may not be applied retroactively to
deprive a party of rights or impose greater liability
unless the later Statute or amendment clarifies or
amplifies how the earlier law should be understood.
(Citing Okland, supra)

Here, there is no issue as to clarification of the 1945 amendment to
42-1-63 which intentionally and unmistakably deleted the lifetime obligation
or

the amployer and inserted in its stead

total

disability

compensation

liability.

the 58,500.00 maximum permanent
See

also,

Jmith

/. Industrial

Commission. 549 ?.2d -48, <*49 (1976) '"benefits were definable as to maximum
3

time for payment and amount, were governed by the wording of the Section on
date of injury . . .**

Any additional benefits would not oe awardab]e by

amendment thereafter . . .
". . .

So amendment in 1973 that did enlarge such benefits would l*ave no

application

here.**

In

that

case,

as_ here,

an

amendment

to

Workers*

Compensation Death Benefit Statute provided greater dependent widow benefits
than the Statute in effect on the date of the injury resulting in death.

The

Utah Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Commission award based upon the
Statute in effect on the date of the injury.
Finally,

see

recent

Court

of

Appeals

decision

in Wicat Systems v.

Pellegrini, 721 P.2d 686, 687 (1989) where the Court held that the allocation
of

liability

amendments

in

1984

increased

plaintiff and thus enlarged its obligations.

the

percentage

liability

of

"These kinds of amendments fit

within the category held not to be retroactive.**

The Court held that the

amendments were not in clarification of existing law and applied properly the
law in effect at the time of injury.
In summary, the law on the date of Applicant's injury in this case was
clear and amendments to the Statute thereafter which enlarged the rights of
Applicant and which created a substantial liability in Defendant Employers*
Reinsurance Fund which did not exist under the Statute in effect at the date
of

injury

cannot

be

applied

retroactively

as

contended

by

Applicant.

Established Utah Workers* Compensation Law as demonstrated by the cases cited
above and many others make it clear that as a matter of law, Applicant has no
permanent total disability rights beyond those awarded to him - and paid under Section 42-1—63 as it existed on -he data or his July 23, 1948 injury.
AS a corollary, 5HF lad no liability to Applicant: under -hat Statute and che
Later Statute amendments cannot be applied retroactively co create a

4

substantial liability for this defendant where no_ liablity existed under the
law in effect on the date of injury.
3.

As a third and separate defense, this Permanent Total Disability
compensation case having been subject to a final Permaa«>4it Total
Disability Order by the Industrial Commission and completely r.iosed
out by full compliance with that Order, is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Commission to reopen for the alleged purpose of ordering
additional compensation.
This

was

beginning.
Statute

a

The

for

the

Permanent
Employer
maximum

Industrial Commission
Disability

benefits

Total

acknowledged

its

injury

from

the

liability under

the

Permanent Total Disability

issued
on

Disability

its Order

August

for

27, 1948.

award.

The

full Permanent Total
That Order was fully

complied with and satisfied by the Employer and the case closed.
Thus,

under

established

Utah

Law,

the

Commission

has

no

jurisdiction, by Statute or otherwise, to reopen the case almost 40
years later and award additional benefits to Applicant or to create
additional liability in the defendants, or either of them.
The

circumstances

involved

and

the

Order

issued

in this case fall

squarely within the rationale of the Jurisdiction Rulings of the following
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Decisions:
a.
b.
c.

Retherford v. Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76 (Utah App.
1987).
Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App.
1987).
Thiessens v. Dept. of Emp. S e c , 663 P.2d 72 (Utah 1983).

Respectfully submitted -his

*Z*J?

day or June, 1991-
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, in the case of
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 90000685
ROBERT L. SEITZ#

*
*

Applicant,

*

ORDER

*

vs.

*

DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

UTAH FUEL aka KAISER COAL and
the EMPLOYERS'REINSURANCE FUND
EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah, on Motion of the Defendcint,
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the Applicant, Robert L.
Seitz, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated May
21, 1991, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.53 and Section
63-46b-12, awarding the Applicant permanent total disability
benefits.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission
for review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann.
The
Defendant, Employer's Reinsurance Fund, argues that the law in
effect at the time of the injury is the controlling statute. In
contrast, the Applicant argues that the statutory changes made by
the legislature on May 10, 1977, mandate that the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund pay the Applicant additional continuing benefits
as a result of his permanent total disability.
Counsel for the Applicant raised the additional issue of his
entitlement to an attorney's fee which includes interest on the
accrued and unpaid compensation due the Applicant.
The Commission is of the opinion that the issues to be decided
are the effect of the May 10, 1977, amendment to section 3 5-1-67
U.C.A. on the Applicant's claim and whether a reasonable attorney's
fee includes interest on the accrued and unpaid compensation.
As mentioned above, the Applicant alleges that permanent total
disability benefits are due and owing from the Employers
Reinsurance Fund or ^'special fund" since tne employer satisfied its
legal liability in this -natter.

SEITZ
ORDER
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The Employers' Reinsurance Fund denies liability on the
grounds that the law in effect on the date of the Applicant's
injury controls the Applicant's entitlement to permanent total
disability benefits.
Further, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
argues that the law only provided for an award of $8,500 from the
employer, with no provision for Employers' Reinsurance Fund
involvement or liability for continuing benefits. The relevant
statutory amendment provides as follows:
All persons who are permanently and
totally disabled and entitled to
benefits from the special fund
designated in subsection (1) of
section 35-1-68 including those
injured prior to March 6, 1949,
shall receive not less than $75 per
week when paid only by the special
fund, or when combined with
compensation payment of the
employer or the insurance carrier,
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the remedial purposes underlying the Workers
Compensation Act and a plain reading of the statutory language, it
appears that the Legislature intended to include the Applicant and
others similarly
situated
on the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund/"special fund" permanent total disability payroll.
Otherwise, the Applicant would have only been entitled to receive
$8,500 for the statutory permanent total disability sustained as
the result of his industrial accidents The language of the statute
indicates that as a result of the inadequacy and injustice of the
provisions for permanent total benefits for those injured before
March 6, 1949, the Legislature amended the Act to include those
previously left outside the scope of §67.
In doing so, the
Legislature intended to correct an injustice and insure that all
permanent total disability claimants would be treated on a more
equal basis.
Therefore, pursuant to §35-1-67, U.C.A., as amended, May 10,
1977, the Applicant is entitled to receive statutory permanent
total disability benefits from the ERF at the statutory minimum
rate of $75 per W€>ek commencing effective May 10, 1977.
The
Administrative Law Judges7 ruling on this point is supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. Further the

SEITZ
ORDER
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Administrative Law Judges' decision that subsequent legislative
enactments increasing the statutory minimum rate for permanent
total disability are also applicable to the Applicant's benefits is
also supported by the evidence.
With regard to the attorney's fees issue, in his Order, the
Administrative Law Judge stated, "Counsel has requested a fee. of
15% of the award generated pursuant to Rule 16, which was in effect
on the date of the industrial injury. I find that the fee under
the circumstances of this case is reasonable with the limitation
that the 15% shall be of the principal sum awarded and shall not
include interest."
Counsel for the Applicant now claims that this award is
unreasonable. In support of his argument, Applicant's attorney
argues that "interest is every bit a part of compensation and that
the generation of compensation in fact includes a concomitant
generation of interest for compensation of a reasonable attorney's
fee."
Counsel also requested that a decision in the above
referenced case be deferred until a decision in DON R. NIELSON
v.MORTON THIOKOL, and the EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND (Case No.
B89000457, 86001144) was rendered.
In Nielsen the Industrial
Commission, in a two to one decision, determined that reasonable
attorney's fees do not include interest generated on accrued and
unpaid compensation benefits. This decision by the Industrial
Commission is controlling precedent. Therefore, counsel for the
Applicant is not entitled to attorney's fees which include interest
on the accrued and unpaid compensation.
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are supported in this case by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record.
,>

For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of the Commission
that the Administrative Law Judges' Order should be affirmed.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the
Employer's Reinsurance Fund, dated June 20, 1991, is hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the
Applicant, Roberr L. Seitz, dated June 24, 1991, is hereby denied.

SEITZ
ORDER
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Any appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty
(30) days of the date hereof pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections
35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-16.
Costs to prepare
transcripts for appeals purposes shall be borne by the party
requesting the transcripts.

Stephen M.' Hadley
Commissioner
. ,
Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

V.J
V~_

I dissent from the majority view because it appears clear to
me that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's position is well founded,
although it is difficult to comprehend and detect the subtle
meaning of the words created in 1977 by the legislature, when it
repealed the provisions from 1971, including its update in 1973,
and from 1974.
In my view, those words created in 1977 say that not less than
$75 per week shall be paid to all permanently and totally disabled
persons, including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, who are
entitled to benefits. In this phrasing, I have restructured the
language from the 1977 enactment to set the emphasized and key
phrase at the last instead of being lost in the middle as it is in
the statute.
Unfortunately, persons such as Mr, Seitz with injuries
incurred between July 1, 1945 and March 4, 1949, inclusive, simply
are excluded from what I would construe was the probable intent of
the 1977 legislation because of the nature of the wording, because
they simply are not entitled to benefits under any law, at any
time, including that in effect at the time of the injury. In other
words, the 1977 statutory change placed Mr. Seitz in a category for
checking to determine if he is entitled to benefits, but the law in
effect at the time of his injury or any other subsequent
modification of that law, simply does, allpjtf /nis specific
entitlement.
..-^ /''
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I certify that on February 7, 1992, a copy of the attached
ORDER DENYING MOTIN FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT L. SEITZ,
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
ERIE V. BOORMAN, ESQ,
Employers 7 Reinsurance Fund of Utah
Mr. Robert L. Seitz
P.O. Box 146
Sunnyside, Utah 84539
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
Dabney & Dabney,
350 South 400 East Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Timothy C. Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

V^w
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Adell Butler-Mitchell
Legal Assistant
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Debra S. RETHERFORD, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
and American Telephone & Telegraph
(Self-Insured), Defendants.
No. 870016-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 22, 1987.
Employer filed motion to dismiss petition for writ of review in workers' compensation case. The Court of Appeals held
that Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to consider worker's petition for reconsideration of denial of motion to review and
the petition thus did not extend the time
for filing petition for writ of review with
the Court of Appeals.
Petition dismissed.

4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1806
Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to consider worker's petition for reconsideration of denial of motion to review so
that time for filing petition for writ of
review with the Court of Appeals began to
run on the date of the notice of the order
disposing of the case on the merits and not
on the date of the later denial of the petition for reconsideration. U.C.A.1953, 351-82.51 et seq.
Phillip B. Shell, Day & Barney, Murray,
for plaintiff.
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for
defendant American Tel. & Tel
Ralph Finlayson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
Industrial Com'n.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
DAVIDSON, JJ. (On Law and Motion).
PER CURIAM:

1. Workers' Compensation <s=»1090, 1778
Administrative law judge has discretion to reopen workers' compensation case
and enter a supplemental order, amend, or
modify the original order, or refer the case
to the entire Industrial Commission for review. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-82.52.
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1782
Failure to present evidence to referee
or Industrial Commission originally does
not justify exercise of the Commission's
continuing jurisdiction so as to authorize it
to enter a later order. U.C.A.1953, 35-178.

This matter is before the Court on the
Motion to Dismiss of defendant American
Telephone and Telegraph (AT & T). AT &
T seeks dismissal of plaintiffs petition for
writ of review, contending that it was not
timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 35-183 (1986). We agree that the petition for
review was not timely filed and dismiss the
petition.

3e Workers' Compensation <3=»1813
Industrial Commission does not have
jurisdiction to consider petition for rehearing. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-82.53.

I.
Plaintiff Debra S. Retherford applied for
workers' compensation benefits claiming
she had suffered injuries from a compensable industrial accident. On October 21,
1986, an administrative law judge ordered
the claim dismissed, with prejudice.1 The
plaintiff filed a Motion for Review on November 10, 1986.2 On November 20, 1986,

1. At the time set for evidentiary hearing, defendant AT & T made a motion to dismiss plaintiffs
claim for failure to state a compensable industrial accident Plaintiffs theory was that she
was subjected to unwanted sexual advances
from a co-employee. The administrative law
judge concluded that based on the legal argument and evidence m tne rile, plaintiff had not
satisfied her burden of ^roving that sne sustained an industrial accident.

2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55 (1986) provides,
in part, that a motion for review "must be filed
within fifteen days of the date of any order of
the administrative law judge or the commission
unless further time is granted by the administrative law judge or commission within fifteen
davs, and unless so filed, said order shall become the award of the commission and shall be
rmai." Tt thus appears that the motion for review tiled on Novemoer 10, 1986 was not time-
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the entire Industrial Commission adopted
the administrative law judge's findings and
conclusions and affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiffs claim. On December 8, 1986, the
plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of Denial of Motion to Review, which was
also denied by the entire commission on
December 19, 1986. On January 20, 1987,
plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review
by this Court
Defendant AT & T moved for summary
disposition of plaintiffs petition for judicial
review on grounds the petition was not
timely, halving been filed approximately sixty days after the Industrial Commission's
Order of November 20, 1986. AT & T
contends that the commission, having once
disposed of the case on the merits, had no
further jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, AT & T contends the motion for
reconsideration could not operate to extend
the time to petition for review by this
Court Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues
that the statutory provisions governing the
review of orders in workers' compensation
cases, while not specifically authorizing a
"motion for reconsideration", do not preclude such motions. Plaintiff thus contends that her petition for writ of review
was timely because it was filed within thirty days after the commission's denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of
Motion for Review.
II.
The statutory provisions governing
claims for workers' compensation benefits
establish a detailed procedure for adminisly. Because neither party addresses the issue of
timeliness of the motion for review, and the
entire record is not before us, we presume,
without ruling on the question, that the commission allowed additional time in which to file the
motion for review. Our consideration is limited
to the issue of whether the petition for writ of
review \was fried vnth this Court vnthin t h e time
period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83
(1986).
3c The present statutory provisions pertaining to
appeals from awards of the Industrial Commission under the worker's compensation statutes
were enacted in >965. Former Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-i.-82 (reDeaied 1965) provided:
Any party including the commission of iinance io a proceeding Derore the commission

trative and judicial review of orders of the
Industrial Commission.3 Hearings on an
application for benefits may be held "before the commission sitting as administrative law judges or any administrative law
judge of the commission, or any commissioner as chief administrative law judge",
after which the commission or the administrative law judge shall make findings of
fact and an order. Utah Code Ann. § 351-82.52 (1986). "The order of the administrative law judge shall be the final award
of the commission unless a petition for
review is filed as provided in 35-1-82.53."
Id
[1] A party may initiate review of the
order of an administrative law judge or the
commission under Utah Code Ann, § 35-182.53 (1986), which provides:
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the order entered by an administrative law judge or the commission
may file a motion for review of such
order. Upon the filing of a motion to
review his order the administrative law
judge may (a) reopen the case and enter
a supplemental order .. or (b) amend or
modify his prior order by a supplemental
order; or (c) refer the entire case to the
commission. If the administrative law
judge makes a supplemental order, as
provided above, it shall be final unless a
motion to review the same shall be filed
with the commission.
The foregoing section allows an administrative law judge the discretion to reopen the
case and enter a supplemental order,
may, and before he can seek a review in the
supreme court shall, within thirty days after
written notice of its decision file an application before the commission for a rehearing of
the matter.
The pre-1965 provisions further provided that
an appeal to the Supreme Court was to be initiated "within thirty days after the notice that the
application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the
application is granted within thirty days after
notice of the rendition of the decision on the
rehearing." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (amended 1965). The 1965 amendments established
f
fte present review orovisions of Utan Code Ann.
§§ 35-1-^2.51 -nrougn 35-1-82.56, and amended section J 5 - i - o 3 to De consistent with 'hose
provisions.
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amend or modify the original order made
pursuant to section 35-1-82.52, or refer the
case to the entire commission for review.
In this manner, an administrative law
judge may correct any error or omission in
the original order before review by the
entire commission. If a supplemental order is entered by an administrative law
judge, a motion for review of that order
may be filed with the commission. Any
motion for review of an original or supplemental order of an administrative law
judge or an order of the commission sitting
as administrative law judges must be filed
within fifteen days of the date of the order
unless an extension is granted within that
fifteen day period by the commission or the
administrative law judge. Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82.55 (1986).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.54 (1986) describes the procedure for administrative review by the commission as follows:
The commission, upon referral of a case
to it by an administrative law judge, or
upon a motion being filed with it to review its own order, or an administrative
law judge's supplemental order, shall review the entire record made in said case,
and, in its discretion, may hold further
hearing and receive further evidence, and
make findings of fact and enter its
award thereon. The award of the commission shall be final unless set aside by
the Supreme Court as hereinafter provided.4
Once the commission has disposed of the
case pursuant to section 35-1-82.53, a party may seek judicial review pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (1986), which
reads*
Within 30 days after the commission has
given notice of its award, provided a
motion was previously filed in accordance with this act for review of the order
or supplemental order upon which the
award was based, any affected party,
including the Division of Finance, may
file an action in the Court of Appeals for
review and determination of the lawfulness of the award.
4. Utah Code Ann. 1 35-i-32.54 (1986) was not
amended to reflect the transfer or mnsdiction
over petitions ror ^eview or Industrial Commis-

III.
There is no case law specifically considering whether the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-82.51 through § 35-1-82.55 allow a motion for reconsideration (or additional motions for review) once the Industrial Commission has rendered its decision
on the merits pursuant to section 35-1-82.54, and if so, whether filing of such a
motion extends the time for filing a petition
for review with this Court Thus, the issues presented by defendant AT & T's motion are of first impression. Cases decided
under the former statutes, however, establish principles regarding judicial review of
orders in workers' compensation cases that
are instructive in this case.
In Ferguson v. Industrial Commission,
63 Utah 112, 221 P. 1099 (1924), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a situation analoguous to the present case. The Industrial
Commission denied benefits to the claimant, and the claimant filed a timely petition
for rehearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82 (repealed 1965), which was also
denied. Approximately four months after
the denial of the petition for rehearing, the
claimant filed a second petition for rehearing, which the commission granted. After
a hearing, the commission again dismissed
the application. Within thirty days from
the date of the order of the commission on
the second petition for rehearing, the claimant applied to the Utah Supreme Court for
a writ of review. The Court held:
The first petition for rehearing having
been denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission ceased.
It was then incumbent upon the applicant
to apply to this court for a writ of review
or to abide by the decision.
221 P. at 1099. See also Crippen v. Sunland Center, 372 So.2d 63 (Fla.1979) (The
time for filing a notice of certiorari was not
tolled by filing of a motion for reconsideration or rehearing where such a motion was
not authorized under the applicable rules of
sion orders to the Utah Court or Appeals as
orovided in LJtan Code Ann. § 55-1-33 U986).
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procedure); Chambers v. Industrial Commission, 132 Ill.App.3d 891, 88 Ill.Dec. 183,
478 N.E.2d 498 (1985) (Where no statute
authorized a motion for reconsideration or
rehearing, the only recourse following entry of a final order was to file a writ of
certiorari.)
[2] The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of the Ferguson case
in Kennecoit Copper Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952
(1967). In that case, the Industrial Commission entered an order on February 17,
1965 denying a claim for benefits. The
claimant filed an application for a rehearing under former Utah Code Ann. § 35-182 (repealed 1965), which was denied on
March 12, 1965. The claimant did not file a
petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah
Supreme Court under former Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-83 (amended 1965). On April
13, 1965, the commission rescinded its order of March 12 denying compensation and
ordered a rehearing. The rehearing was
held and, on December 14, 1965, the commission entered an order granting benefits
to the claimant Kennecott petitioned for
judicial review contending that the commission did not have authority to make the
5. The Utah Supreme Court also held in the Kennecott Copper Corporation case that Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) did not grant the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to reverse its original order. That section provides, in relevant
part: 'The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and
it may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings,
or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion
may be justified
" Case law construing section 35-1-78 has established that the continuing
jurisdiction of the commission is applicable
where there has been a change in the claimant's
condition (an improvement or deterioration of
physical condition) since the time of the commission's order, or where evidence has been
discovered that was not available for consideration when the original order was made. See
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952, 953 (1967);
see also Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692
P.2d 783, 736 (Utah 1984); Spencer v. Industrial
Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185. 290 P.2d 692, 69495 (1955); Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, ol Utah 514, 215 P.* 1047, 1048 (Utah 1923),
Because rtie commission's order in tnis case
held that there was no comoensable industrial
accident, there is no issue as to wnich reopening

award. The Court considered whether the
commission, having denied the first petition
for rehearing, could reopen the case and
reverse its original order. The Utah Supreme Court concluded the holding in Fer~
guson v. Industrial Commission was dispositive, and held that the commission did
not have jurisdiction to make the award of
benefits having once determined the matter
on the merits.5
f33 The provisions for review of orders
of the Industrial Commission in worker's
compensation cases do not authorize motions for reconsideration or rehearing or
additional motions to review beyond those
motions authorized in Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82.53 (1986).6 The statutory review
procedure provides adequate opportunity
for correction of error by the commission,
and establishes the point at which the proceedings before the commission are culminated. In addition, the Utah Supreme
Court held in Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984) that in
filing a motion for review under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-82.53, a claimant has an obligation to raise all issues that can be
presented at that time and. those issues not
for a change in condition would apply. See 3
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 8L32(a) (In a reopening proceeding, neither party
can raise original issues such as work-connection, employee or employer status, occurrence
of a compensable accident, and degree of disability.) At the time of oral argument, plaintiffs counsel represented that certain matters
that could have been presented below were not
advanced by plaintiffs previous counsel. We
conclude that such an omission does not justify
an exercise of the commission's continuing jurisdiction. See also Pease v. Industrial
Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984) (In filing a
motion for review under Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82.54, a person has an obligation to
raise all issues that can be presented at that time
and those issues not raised are waived.)
6.

As alternative grounds for dismissal, AT & T
contends that Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d
74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), in which the Utah
Supreme Court heid that no 'motion for reconsideration" is allowed under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is aist>ositive of tnis rnattei". Because we conciuae dismissal of the petition for
review is required under the workers' compensation statutes, ve find it unnecessary to address this argument.

80

Utah

739 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

raised are waived. It logically follows that
the availability of a petition for rehearing
should not be implied from the absence of
any express prohibition in the statute, and
we reject plaintiffs contention to that effect
[4] The jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission over workers' compensation
cases is fixed by statute, as is this Court's
jurisdiction over judicial review of the Commission's orders. See Schockmeyer v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 346, 463
P.2d 562 (Utah 1970); see also 3 Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 80.52(a)
(1986). Based upon our reading of the
review provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82.51 et seq. and case law under the
former statutory provisions, we conclude
that the commission had no jurisdiction to
consider the Petition for Reconsideration of
Denial of Motion to Review.7 The time for
filing a petition for writ of review with this
Court began to run on November 20, 1986,
the date of notice of the order of the commission disposing of the case on the merits.8 No petition for writ of review was
filed within thirty days of the date of notice
of the order as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-83 (1986). This Court is without
jurisdiction to review the final order of the
commission because plaintiffs petition for
writ of review was not timely filed. Plaintiffs petition for writ of review is, accordingly, dismissed.
BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON,
JJ., concur.

»>
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7. As in the Ferguson case, although the proceedings subsequent to November 20, 1986 were
without authority, they did not change the result
previously reached. 221 P. at 1099. The November 20, 1986 order is the final order of the
commission for purposes of seeking judicial review.
3. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.56 (1986) provides:

All parties in interest snail be given due notice

Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Allen ISSA, dba Allen's TV &
Electronics, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 860012-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 1, 1987.

Tractor trailer owner brought negligence action against motorist, seeking
damages allegedly sustained when tractor
trailer overturned. The District Court,
Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered
judgment on verdict finding each party 50%
negligent, and owner appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
court's instructions adequately set out
owner's theory of case.
Affirmed.

1. Trial <3=>203(1)
A party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.
2. Appeal and Error <®=>1067
Trial <s=>268
Failure to give requested instructions
is reversible error if it tends to mislead the
jury to the prejudice of the complaining
party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury of the law.
3. Appeal and Error «=>1067
It is not prejudicial error to fail to use
specific requested jury instructions if the
substance of the requested instructions is
covered in the instructions given.
of the entry of any administrative law judge's
order or any order or award of the commission.
The mailing of the copy of said order or award
to the last known address shown in the files of
the commission or any party in interest and to
the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if
any, snail be deemed to be notice of said order/'
The November 20, 1986 order reflects that it
was maiied to plaintiff on the same date.

EXHIBIT "M"
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Divorce €=252
Divorce court's award with respect to
property and money payments to be made
by husband was proper despite fact that it
did not conform to husband's contention
that he should receive two-thirds of property.

E. H. Fankhauser, of Cotro-Manes,
Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Ray H. I vie, of I vie, Young & Stott,
Provo, for defendant and respondent

judge, — who was malleable enough to
soothe the pain somewhat of Mr. L., appellant, — by reducing the amount of the
award on the latter's motion, but which
did not comport to, but exceeded the onethird, two-third number we think was correct. This does not distiguish such philosophy to such a degree as to overrule our
previous pronouncements to the contrary.
An examination of this record constrains
us to sustain the trial court and to say that
the evidence, looked at favorablv tn respondent, reflects neither
~ /I
factual atmosphere nor a
wisdom.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:
Appeal from a judgment in a divorce
case, where after an amendment in the
pleadings and proof reducing the amount
of a previous award, and favoring appellant in such amendment with respect to
property and money payments, he nonetheless appealed. Affirmed with no costs on
appeal assessed.
The parties married in 1950. About seven months later came their first child. A
divorce followed in April 1952, followed by
another child in July 1952, followed by a
resumption, without benefit of marriage, of
the bed and board bit, followed by the purchase jointly of a home, followed by another child in November 1954, followed by a
marriage ceremony in 1956, followed by recording of the deed to the house as husband and wife, who were not that at the
time of the purchase, after which another
child was born in 1961. Three and a half
years later they separated and Mr. L. sued
for a divorce, and Mrs. L. countered, won,
got a property and alimony award. Mr. L.
now says: 1) The decree was inequitable,
2) exceeds the sort of dowered theory of
one-third to the woman and two-thirds to
the man syndrome, and 3) anyway the decree otherwise was inequitable.
The one-third, two-third computer complex seems to be the thrust of this case.
The computer may be accurate mathematically, but this court has a different set of
ioganthms. The decision of the trial

ELLETT, CROCKET]
and MAUGHAN, JJ., concu

J522Je*
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George 0. SMITH, Deceased, and Llla J.
Smith, widow, Plaintiffs,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the

State of Utah et a I., Defendants.
No. 14275.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 28, 1976.
Deceased workman's widow sought
review of adequacy of Industrial Commission award. The Supreme Court, Henriod,
C. J., held that where workman was injured in 1968 and died in 1972, benefits
made available to widows under 1973 statutory amendments were not available to the
widow in question even though award was
not made until 1975.
Affirmed.
:. Workmen's Compensation <§=>60
Where workman was injured in 1968
and died in 1972, additional benefits

STATE v. VICEERS
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awardable under 1973 amendments were
not available to the workman's wholly dependent widow, even though award was
not made until 1975. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68.
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=>I934

Failure of widow to join in employer's petition for review and to ask for
review within 15 days after the award
precluded her from asserting any further
claim to benefits beyond those awarded.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68, 35-1-82.55.

[2] Petitioner did not join in defendants' petition for review, was not particeps thereto, and anyway, the issue
raised by them are not those raised by
her here. Besides, she did not ask for a
review within 15 days after the award, as
interdicted by Title 35-1-82.55, all of
which has precluded her from asserting
any claim further.
ELLETT, CROCKETT, TUCKETT and
MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae &
Richardson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank
V, Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen.f Salt Lake
City, for defendants.
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HENRIOD, Chief Justice:
Review of the adequacy of a Commission award. Affirmed with no costs.
This was a very protracted case, where
an award was made on June 13, 1975,
seven years after the injury of the applicant's husband, in the course of his employment, on May 7, 1968, when he fell
from a ladder, injured his head against a
pipe and died on May 25, 1972.
[1] The petitioner urges one point on
review: That the Commission did not
award her, a wholly dependent widow,
sufficient entitlement under Section 35-168, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The benefits were definable as to maximum time
for payment and amount, were governed
by the wording of the section on date
of injury, 1 and it appears the award fully
complied with or exceeded such provisions. (Laws Utah 1967, Ch. 65, Sec. 1.)
Any additional benefits would not be
awardable by amendment thereafter, and
subsection 4. paragraphs 5 and 6 so amended in 1973 2 that did eniarge such benefits
would have no application here.
• Utah Road Comm. v. Industrial
t7om*»«f
109 U t a h 553, 168 ?.2d 319 (1946).
549 P.2d—i9

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Robert Maxson VICKERS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14300.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 28, 1976.
Defendant was convicted in District
Court, Washington County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., of placing an infernal machine,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court,
Tuckett, J., held that the device affixed
by defendant to an automobile came within the statutory definition of an "infernal
machine" and that the trial court correctly refused to submit the crime of arson to
Affirmed,
I. Explosives <$=*2

Device consisting of explosive, blasting cap and length or fuse which, when
used, provided lapse of time constituted
2.

Laws oi Utah, 1973, Ch.

Sec. o.

EXHIBIT "N"
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additional opportunity to so misuse it,"
and the state accordingly loses none of
its rights when the property is seized,
sold, and the proceeds paid to any innocent party who can prove a bona fide
interest therein.
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Trenton v.
State, 167 Ga.App. 77, 306 S.E.2d 11, 13
(1983) (quoting Hallman v. State, 141 Ga.
App. 527, 233 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1977)). See
also State v. Fouse, 120 Wis.2d 471, 355
N.W.2d 366, 370 (CtApp.1984).3
Even where a forfeiture statute expressly required that a security interest be perfected before it was exempted, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that although the
holder of an unperfected interest could not
prevent the forfeiture, the holder was still
entitled to compensation for his or her interest in the forfeited vehicle after the
forfeiture had occurred. State v, Fouse,
120 Wis.2d 471, 355 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Ct
App.1984).4
Based on the foregoing, we find the Lauritos had a bona fide security interest under § 5&-37-13. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's award of the Trans Am to
the State subject to the Lauritos' interest

WICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford
Insurance Group, Petitioners,
v.
Sylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury
Fund of Utah, and Industrial
Commission of Utah, Respondents.
No. 880218-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 22, 1989.

Injured employee filed claim with Industrial Commission for permanent total
disability. Following parties, stipulation as
to disability, the Industrial Commission determined that postinjury amendment to
statute controlled computation of employer's share of liability, and employer sought
review. The Court of Appeals, Davidson,
J., held that amendment to workers' compensation statute which enlarged employer's obligation by increasing its percentage
of liability for employee's disability could
not be applied retroactively.
Reversed.

BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
(O
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3. Some courts have expressed a concern that
allowing parties with unperfected security interests to maintain an interest in property subject
to forfeiture will lead to fraudulent claims. We
agree with the Alaska Supreme Court which
observed that "the holder of an allegedly unperfected security interest must prove to the court
that he or she has such an interest
Placing
the burden on the party asserting the interest to
demonstrate the existence of a security interest
will reduce the possibility of fraud." Fehir v.
State, 755 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Alaska 1988).
4. Cases holding that a security interest must be
perfected before the holder's interest will be
recognized under a criminal forfeiture statute
all rely on statutory language which expressly
requires perfection. See United States v. One
1951 Douglas DCS Aircraft, 525 F.Supp. 13,
15-16 (D.Tenn.i979), aff'a\ 667 ?2d 502 (6th

1. Workers' Compensation <s=>55
Employer's responsibilities to pay
workers' compensation to employee whose
wrist injury rendered her permanently and
totally disabled was similar to a contractual
Cir.1981), cert denied, 462 VS. 1105, 103 S.Ct.
2451, 77 L.EcL2d 1332 (1982) (unsecured interest of intervenor must yield to that of government because statute provided that "no interest
in an aircraft is valid against anyone other than
the conveyor of the interest until the holder
records it with the FAA"); In re Forfeiture of
One 1979 Chevrolet CIO Van, 490 So.2d 240, 241
(Fla.CtApp.1986) (court based its finding on
statute specifically requiring that lien be perfected in manner prescribed by law); State v. One
Certain Conveyance 1978 Dodge Magnum, 334
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1983) (claimant's lien
must be "of record" at time of seizure in order
to be deemed superior to State's interest upon
forfeiture: statute provided that oniy iienhoiders or record are entitled to receive notice of a
forfeiture hearing).

WICAT SYSTEMS v. PELLEGRINI
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obligation for purposes of determining
whether law affecting employer's liability
could be retroactively applied.
2. Workers' Compensation <3=»55
Amendments to workers' compensation
statute, under which employer's share of
liability for disability of employee which
was partially caused by work-related injury
would be enlarged by statutory amendments increasing percentage of liability,
could not be retroactively applied. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-69; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69 (Repealed).
Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for
appellants.
Erie V. Boorman, Second Injury Fund,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and
GARFF, JJ.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
On June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an
employee of Wicat Systems, injured her
wrist while at work. In 1987, Pellegrini
filed a claim with the Industrial Commission for permanent total disability. The
parties stipulated that Pellegrini had a
preexisting impairment of 46% prior to
1980, that she incurred an additional 12%
impairment prior to 1983, that the injury to
her wrist caused another 24% impairment,1
and that she was now, with the wrist injury, ]5ermanently and totally disabled. The
only issue before the Administrative Law
Judge (A.LJ.) was the proper apportionment between Wicat Systems and the Second Injury Fund.
The A.LJ. determined that Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-69 (as amended 1984) controlled, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred in 1983, and so computed Wicaf s
•tare of the liability at ^wths or 37.5%.
Wicat filed a motion for review claiming
**t the 1981 version of section 35-1-59,
*tucn womd have siaced its share of liaoili*y at i2/s4ths or 18.75%, inouid have <nstead
"Vse ire wftoie person lmDairment oercent***U»«»ft«KJ 770-775 P 2 d — 7

been applied. The Commission denied Wicat's motion.
The sole issue before us is whether the
1984 amendments to section 35-1-69 were
procedural or remedial such that they could
be applied retroactively to an injury that
occurred before the effective date of the
amendments.2 We hold that the amendments were not remedial, and, therefore,
did not apply retroactively.
In workers' compensation cases, we generally apply the law existing at the time of
injury. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737
P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987); Kennecott
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305,
308 (Utah App.1987); Marshall v. Industrial Comm\
704 R2d 581, 582 (Utah
1985). Under this rule, the 1981 version of
section 35-1-69 would generally apply to
Pellegrini's accident, since it was the law at
the time she was injured. However, there
are exceptions to this general rule. If
amendments are procedural and do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, the amended statute may
be applied retroactively to accidents which
occurred before the amendments became
effective. Moore, 737 P.2d at 990. Furthermore, if the amendments "deprive a
party of rights or impose greater liability,"
but are enacted to "clarif[y] or amplif[y]
how the earlier law should have been understood," in other words, remedial in nature, the amendments can still be retroactively applied. Kennecott Corp., 740 P.2d
at 308.
[1,2] In the instant case, Wicat's responsibilities to pay workers' compensation
to Pellegrini were similar to contractual
obligations. Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1975). The
level of Wicaf s liability was set by the
1981 version of the statute. However,
when the 1984 amendments were enacted
they increased the percentage of liability of
Wicat, dius enlarging those obligations.
These kinds of amendments 'It within :he
category neia not to be retroactive. See
2.

J I 1988. section ^5-I-o9 * 1984) was reoeaied.
The rcenacted Utan Coae Ann. s 35-*-o9 (1988)
aoandoned tne ianguage n question.
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Kennecott, 740 P.2d at 308; cf. Moore, 737
P.2d at 990.
Pellegrini, however, argues that even
though the 1984 amendments may have
enlarged or increased Wicat's contractual
obligations they were meant to clear up
some confusion in the law under section
35-1-69 as amended in 1981. Therefore,
Pellegrini argues these amendments are remedial and retroactive. Pellegrini refers to
Kerans v. Industrial Coram % 713 P.2d 49
(Utah 1986), Jacobsen Construction v.
Hair, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983), and Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n,
639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981) to show this confusion.
We are not persuaded by Pellegrini's argument Hair required use of combined
impairment ratings in the equation rather
than both whole and combined ratings.
The other cases dealt with other closely
connected issues, but did not directly contradict or overturn Hair. We find no confusion or ambiguity requiring clarification
or amplification in these cases. The legislature changed the statute to require use
of both whole person and combined impairment ratings to determine liability and did
so in the 1984 amendments. However, that
fact by itself does not require us to conclude the legislature was clarifying or amplifying the preexisting law.
Since the 1984 amendments to section
35-1-69 cannot be applied retroactively, the
law controlling Pellegrini's case was the
law in effect at the time of her injury.
Accordingly, we apply the 1981 version of
section 35-1-69 as interpreted by the Hair
case. Under that formulation, Wicat's portion of liability for Pellegrini's injury
is ^/wths or 18.75%.
The order of the Commission is reversed.
Liability is apportioned ^/wths or 18.75% to
Wicat and 5 ^ths or 81.25% to the Second
Injury Fund.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

Joseph MORITZSKY, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880395-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1989.

Defendant was convicted in the Uintah
County Court, Dennis L. Draney, J., of
aggravated assault, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that defendant did not receive effective assistance
of counsel in aggravated assault trial
where his counsel obtained a defense of
habitation instruction in accord with inapplicable pre-1985 version of applicable statute which failed to incorporate statutory
presumption that defendant acted reasonably assuming it found the defense otherwise applicable.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Assault and Battery «=»69, 82
Homicide <s*123,151(1)
Where a defendant entitled to assert
defense of habitation establishes that he
used force in defense of his habitation
against unlawful entry or attempted entry
and, in case of deadly force, that unlawful
entry was violent, tumultuous, surreptitious, in stealth, or for purpose of committing a felony, defendant's actions and beliefs will be presumed reasonable and State
must rebut presumption to invalidate the
defense. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-405.
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(2)
Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel in aggravated assault
trial where his counsel obtained a defense
of habitation instruction in accord with inapplicable pre-1985 version of statute
which tailed to incorporate statutory presumption of reasonableness of defendant's
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5 search, when, in fact, Tollefson subsequently marijuana.
Fused to consent to the trooper's search of the
We are troubled that when existing law demonsthide. These facts allow for the equally valid rates a difference between federal and state law,
nclusion that defendant consented to the search parties fail even to mention, much less brief, state
ily if Tollefson likewise gave her consent. Such constitutional issues. Until and unless parties brief
nditional consent would not necessarily meet the search and seizure questions under the state constinirth Amendment's requirement of consent' in tution, Utah's citizens will remain at the mercy of
ct. See Schncckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, the "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of contr\&, 93 S. Ct. 2041,2059 (1973).
adictory and confusing rationalizations and distincSee also United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, tions" marking federal search and seizure law. Stare
)9-10 (10th Cir. 1986)(officer smelling "strong v. Hygh,
711 P . 2 d 264, 271-72 (Utah
Jor of marijuana" on driver gave officer probable 1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
luse to search vehicle without warrant); United 8. We make no statement as to whether our decision
tales v. Spcrow, 551 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir.), cert, would be the same if Trooper BushnelTs search had
enied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977); United not, in fact, found marijuana in the vehicle. Cf. Artates v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229, 1231 (10th royo, 796 P.2d at 688 (search and seizure based
ir. 1973); accord United States v. Marshall, 878 on pretext violated constitution).
.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1989)("[0]nce the officer
etected the odor of marijuana, probable cause
usted to search the vehicle."); United States v.
leed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989)(The officer
Cite as
detected the distinct odor of burnt marihuana, and
181 Utah Adv. Rep. 60
tiis in itself would have justified the subsequent
earch of [the] vehicle."); United States, v. Haley,
IN T H E
69 F.2d 201, 204 (4th Cir.)(patroIman had probable
ause after he stopped speeding automobile, smelled
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Qtense odor of marijuana emanating from driver's
K>dy while he sat in police cruiser, and also smelled Dr. James FERRO,
trong marijuana odor when passenger roiled down
Petitioner,
vindow of stopped vehicle), cert, denied, 457 U.S.
v.
[117, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982); State v. Koch, 455 So.
id 492, 494 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984)("Once the stop was UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
nade, the officer's detection of the odor of marij- Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing,
iana was probable cause for the search.").
Respondent.
$. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has held that a search following an
afficer's detection of the odor of marijuana is jus- N o . 910313-CA
tified under the vehicle exception to the warrant FILED: March 3,1992
requirement. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d
1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1991X*The smell of marijuana,
the false floor and ceiling, and [defendant's] nerv- Original Proceeding in this Court
ousness together gave [the officer] probable cause to Daniel G . Darger, Salt Lake City, for
inspect the truck, which falls within the vehicle Petitioner
exception to the warrant requirement. ")(citing CalATTORNEYS:
ifornia v, Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93, 105 S. Ct.
2066, 2068-70 (1985); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 R. Paul Van Dam and Robert Steed, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent
U.S. 42,50-51,90 S. Ct. 1975,1980-81 (1970)).
7. Defendant does not challenge the search under
Before
Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We,
therefore, are precluded from analyzing the search
This opinion is subject to revision before
under the Utah Constitution. See State v. Belgard,
811 P.2d 211,215-16 (Utah App. 1991).
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
We note, however, the standard required by the
Utah Constitution may not parallel the federal standard. Recently, in considering the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, the Utah
Supreme Court disagreed with federal decisions
holding no showing of exigent circumstances is
necessary to search a vehicle without a warrant. See,
e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066. Reasoning the federal decisions "cannot be squared with
the oft-stated principle that warrants-whenpracticable is the best policy," in State v. Larocco
the Utah Supreme Court held Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution requires /both probable
cause and exigent circumstances [be] oresent at the
time of the searcn." 794 P 2d 460, 470 (Utah A990);
accord State v. Sims, 308 P.2d 141 Utah App.
1991). The considerations requiring i lowing oi
exigent circumstances under the automobile exception seem to apply with equal force to tne searcn oi
a vemcie oased on an olficer aetecting tne oaor oi

BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Dr. James Ferro seeks licensure
as a psychologist in the State of Utah. The
Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing (Division) denied his application.
Dr. Ferro has petitioned this court to review
the Division's denial of his application. We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
Dr. Ferro received his doctoral degree in
psychology from the Union for Experimenting
Colleges and Universities (UECU) in 1980. At
that time, J E C U was not an accredited msfr
tution. la 1985, UECU became accredited wun
the regional accrediting body. fn 1986, Or.
Ferro bougnt licensure as a psychologist in tn
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State of Utah by filing an application with the properly).4
Division. That application was denied because
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Or. Ferro's doctoral degree was not from an
The Division's actions are governed by the
accredited university as required by subsection
V2Xc) o( the Psychologists' Licensing Act Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
JheAct). Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-l to- Utah Code Ann. § § 6 3 - 4 6 b - l to-22
(1989). Dr. Ferro claims he is entitled to relief
13(1990).*
under subsection 16(4)(d), which provides that
In 1990, Dr. Ferro submitted a second we may grant relief if an agency's interpretaamplication to the Division. The application tion of the law is erroneous. We review statIndicated that five months earlier, Dr. Ferro utory interpretations by agencies for correcthad received a license as a psychologist in ness, giving no deference to the agency's intCalifornia. He therefore requested that his erpretation, unless the statute grants to the
application be considered under the recently agency the discretion to interpret the statute.
added reciprocity provision for psychologists Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax
licensed to practice in other states. See Utah Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581,588 (Utah 1991).
Code Ann. § 58-25a-5 (1990). Again, the
A grant of discretion to interpret a statute
Division denied his application, indicating in a may be explicit or implicit. Id. at 588. There is
letter that "California's licensure requirements no explicit grant of discretion provided in the
arc not equal to Utah's requirements and that Act whereby the Division is directed to interyour licensure status in California is not sub- pret the language involved here. We therefore
stantially in compliance with the provisions of must determine whether there is an implicit
the Psychology Licensing Act." As the Divi- grant of discretion. Id. at 589. To do so, we
sion admits, neither the Division nor the first determine whether the statute is ambigPsychologists' Licensing Board (Board) con- uous. If the statute is clear and unambiguous,
ducted a complete evaluation of Dr. Ferrous there is no implicit grant of discretion possible
application because of the Division's determ- because there is no interpretation required by
ination that Dr. Ferro failed to meet the thr- the agency. The agency simply applies the
eshold requirement of having completed a statute according to its plain language.5
doctoral program at an accredited school.
If a statute is ambiguous, however, we
h Dr. Ferro sought and obtained a review of
the denial of his application by a special apply traditional rules of statutory construcappeals board called by the Division. Follo- tion under the assumption that the Legislature
wing the hearing, the special appeals board was operating under such rules. We also
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of assume that the Legislature expected the
law recommending rejection of Dr. Ferro's agency to likewise apply the traditional rules
application because he did not meet the of statutory interpretation. No deference is
minimum mandatory education requirements therefore given to the agency's interpretation
found in Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-3 if an otherwise ambiguous statute may be
("section 3"). The Division followed the rec- interpreted in accordance with traditional rules
ommendation of the special appeals board and of interpretation. See Morton at 589.
If, however, a traditional analysis of the
rejected Dr. Ferro's second application.2
statute
does not resolve the ambiguities and
Dr. Ferro claims his doctoral degree satisfies
the education requirements of section 3 "there is no discernible legislative intent conbecause UECU was accredited at the time he cerning a specific issue[,] the Legislature has,
applied for licensure. In the alternative, he in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a
asserts that he qualifies for a case-by-case case, it is appropriate to conclude that the
review of his qualifications under the terms of Legislature has delegated authority to the
Utah's reciprocity statute, and that any stat- agency to decide the issue." Id. We assume
utory bar against him applying for licensure is that the Legislature expected the agency to use
its expertise in choosing between the possible
unconstitutional.3
permissible
interpretations. Id. The choice of
Dr. Ferro also asserts that he is entitled to
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988. We interpretations in such cases is therefore
the agency to
decline to address this issue, however, because viewed as a policy decision by
6
which
we
give
deference.
Id.
As
is apparent
Dr. Ferro's brief lacks sufficient legal analysis
to support the claim. See Utah R. App. P, from our analysis, we find no explicit or
2%)(9) (1991) ("The argument shall contain implicit grant of discretion to the Division in
f
iae contentions and reasons ot the appellant this case and therefore aopty a correction-of^uh '-espect to Lhe .ssues presented, wuh cit- error standard o the Division's interpretation
rons fo the iuthonties rand] statutes .* of the Act.
^ e d on.7); Utah R. Aop. 3 . 18 (1991)
ANALYSIS
* appelate mies aopiy equally to administrative
Petitions). See also State v. Price, 180 Utah
Accreditation
^dv. Rep. 25, 26 (Utah App. 1992) ,
First ve address Dr. Ferro s uaim that ais
^appellant's briet must contain adequate legal | doctoral aegree .rom a ^cnool that was aot
aoaiysis or we will assume the tnbunal acted I accreditea at the time ne graduated satisfies
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tie statutory requirement of a doctoral degree i
rom an accredited institution. According to j
)r. Ferro, his degree satisfies this requirement
ecause UECU was accredited at the time of
is application. The Division, however, held as
matter of law that Dr. Ferro's doctoral
egree did not satisfy the educational requirment because the school was not accredited at
le time Dr. Ferro attended and graduated.
>r. Ferro asserts that the educational requirnent is ambiguous on this point.
Section 3 provides that in order for an
pplicant to sit for the exam, the applicant
tust "produce certified transcripts of credit
om an accredited institution of higher eduition recognized by the division verifying
itisfactory completion of a doctoral degree in
sychology." Section 58-25a-3(2)(c). Dr.
;rro asserts that the phrase "certified transipts of credit from an accredited institution"
dicates that the transcript must come from
1 institution that is accredited at the time the
anscript is submitted; in other words, the
irase "from an accredited institution" qualles the term "transcript." The Division on the
her hand, asserts that the credit must be
om an institution accredited at the time the
edit and doctoral degree are received; in
her words, the phrase "from an accredited
stitution" qualifies the term "credit." When
ewed in isolation, this provision is ambig>us because it "can be understood by reasoibly well-informed persons to have diffent meanings." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
9 P.2d 231,233 (Utah App. 1990).
In determining whether the Legislature has
tplicitly granted the Division the discretion
interpret this education requirement, we
st apply traditional statutory rules of consiction. "[Qualifying words and phrases are
nerally regarded as applying to the immedely preceding words, rather than to more
mote ones." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
yunty, 568 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1977)
>otnote omitted). Under this "last antecedent
le," the Division's interpretation is clearly
rrect.
The Division's interpretation is also suppted by another cardinal rule of construction:
f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
ianing or application of the provisions of an
t, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its
tirety, in light of its objective, and to har>nize its provisions in accordance with the
;islative intent and purpose." Osuala v.
nna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah
80) (footnotes omitted). The purpose of the |
t "s to protect the public from unqualified I
rsons by ensuring that applicants for licence have certain minimum qualifications. See i
tion58-25a-i.
\ requirement that an applicant present a
*ree rrom an institution that is accreditea at
' time of application, without any regard tor
ether the school was accredited at ^he fime

Provo, Utah

the degree was obtained, would be useless in
ensuring a minimum standard of education.
The accreditation status of a school at the
time of application has no rational bearing on
the quality of education actually received by
the applicant. Accreditation at the time the
student attended, on the other hand, is indicative of the quality of education received. A
requirement of accreditation at the time of
graduating therefore furthers the purpose of
ensuring certain minimum educational standards. Under Dr. Ferro's interpretation, a
graduate of a fully accredited and perhaps
even highly prestigious school could be barred
from applying for licensure in this state if,
following the applicant's graduation, the
school were to lose its accreditation. Such a
result would clearly be illogical and inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
Inasmuch as the statute may be interpreted
in accordance with traditional rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the Legislature has not left this issue unresolved. We
therefore need not give any deference to the
Division's interpretation. We nevertheless
uphold the Division's interpretation as
correct.7 Dr. Ferro's doctoral degree, which is
from an institution that was not accredited at
the time the degree was obtained, does not
satisfy the educational requirement found in
subsection 3(2)(c) of the Act.
Reciprocity
Dr. Ferro next argues that even if his doctoral degree does not satisfy the minimum
educational requirements for licensure found
in section 3, he is entitled as a licensed psychologist in the State of California to an individual review of his credentials under the
reciprocity provision found in section 5 of the
Act. The reciprocity provision provides that:
The division with the approval of
the board may issue a license under
this chapter to an applicant who is
currently licensed as a psychologist
in any state, district, or territory of
the United States or in any other
jurisdiction approved by the board,
and whose education, experience,
examination, and character requirements are, or were at the time the
license was issued, equal to the
requirements of this chapter or upon a
finding
by the board
that
the applicant, based upon education, experience, examination, and
licensure status is substantially in
compliance with ,he provisions of
this cnapter.
Utah Code Ann. S58-25a-5 (1990)
(emohasis added).
"Tie ^peciai appeals ooard +ound that
oecause the State ol California ioes not
require i degree trom an accredited nstitu-
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tion, California's requirements were not in
actual or substantial compliance with Utah's
requirements.9 The special appeals board also
indicated that since the Board does not have
express statutory authority to conduct an
independent review of a non-accredited
school's doctoral program, as does California's board, that the requirement of a doctoral degree from an accredited school is
mandatory for all applicants. The special
appeals board therefore concluded that
nothing short of actual compliance in the form
of a doctoral degree from an accredited school
would suffice, regardless of the reciprocity
provision.
Dr. Ferro claims that the special appeals
board nuisinterpreted the Act by ignoring the
reciprocity provision with its express reference
to substantial compliance. According to Dr.
Ferro, the reciprocity provision grants him an
opportunity to become licensed in Utah, even
if he does not meet all of the minimum requirements found in section 3. Dr* Ferro asserts
that the Board may grant him a license if it
finds his credentials to be sufficient to meet
the purpose of the Act, i.e., protecting the
public from unqualified applicants. See generally Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204,
206 (Utah App. 1988) (substantial compliance
is appropriate when the purpose of the statute
"can be accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed, with substantially the same
results."1 (quoting Wilcox v. Billings, 200
Kan. 654, 659,438 P.2d 108,112 (1968)).
The Etivision contends, that the substantial
compliance language is of no effect because
there is no other statutory language expressly
permitting the board to admit an applicant
with less than the mandatory minimum requ«
irements found in section 3. What the Division
fails to acknowledge, however, is that the
reciprocity provision itself is the statutory
authorization for adjusting the minimum
requirements for reciprocity applicants.
The Division resorts to the well-established
rule of statutory construction that specific
provisions prevail over general provisions.
Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, ISA P.2d
41, 48 (Utah 1988). The Division misapplies
the rule, however, by mischaracterizing what is
specific and what is general. The Division
views section 3 as the more specific provision.
Section 3, however, applies generally to all
applicants. The reciprocity provision applies
only to a subgroup of all applicants, i.e.,
reciprocity applicants, and is therefore the
more specific provision. See Williams, 754
P.2d at 48 (provisions of title 54 of the Code
are nore CDecific than UAPA since title 54
applies only to the Public Service Commission
ana regulated utilities, whiie UAPA applies to
ail agencies); Southern Jtan Wilderness Allidnce v. 3oard of State Lands and Forestry,
No. 910129, olio op. at 4 (Utah Feb. 27, 1992)
(provision oi UAPA exoressiy excluding from
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its effect contracts for the sale of real property
by all agencies is superseded by provision of
title 65A expressly mandating that board's
actions are governed by UAPA). See also
Osuala, 608 P.2d at 242-43 (section limiting
insurance coverage to three classes of persons
prevailed over general purpose language). By
its own terms, the reciprocity provision is
therefore a specific exception from the general
requirements of section 3.
The reciprocity provision is clearly intended
to allow licensure of applicants with less than
the minimum requirements set forth in section
3 because of their licensed status in other
states. If the Legislature did not intend to
limit or modify section 3, i.e., if it intended
that reciprocity applicants strictly comply with
that section, there would have been no need
for a reciprocity provision. The reciprocity
applicants would simply qualify directly under
section 3.
To interpret the Act so as to ignore the
reciprocity provision's express exception fiom
the general requirements of section 3, would
be to rewrite the Act and impermissibly render
the reciprocity provision a complete nullity. See
Williams v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.,
763 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988) (agency may
not rewrite legislation); Downey State Bank v.
Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288
(Utah 1978) (statutes should be read so as to
avoid making any of their provisions
* surplusage and meaningless"); Bagshaw v.
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App.
1990) (applying general rather than specific
provision would effectively repeal the specific
provision). To adopt the Division's interpretation would also be contrary to our duty to
"construe a statute on the assumption that
each term is used advisedly and that the intent
of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the
term in the context and structure in which it is
placed." Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d
265, 266 (Utah 1984). See also Madsen v„
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.U (Utah 1988)
(appellate courts have fundamental duty to
give effect, if possible, to every word of a
statute).
[A] statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it
is unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume that each
term in the statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that
each should be interpreted and
applied according to its usually
accepted meaning.
West Jordan v. Morrison, 556 ?.2d 445, 446
(Utah 1982) (citation omitted).
The reciprocity provision s exception co ine
general requirements of section 3 is not contused or moDeraoie. 'We must oe guided ^y
the law as t :s. We cannot ay construction
Uberaiize the statute and enlarge its provisions.
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accordance with rules established by the
/hen language is clear and unambiguous, it
division in collaboration with the board;
mst be held to mean what it expresses, and
and
o room is left for construction." Hanchett v.
(e) pay a fee to the department as
\urbidge, 59 Utah 127, 202 P . 377, 380
determined by it in accordance with
1921). We therefore must give effect to the
Subsection 63-38-3(2).
lain and unambiguous terms of the reciproity provision by recognizing that it creates an
2. The Division was bound by statute to follow the
xception to the general requirements found in recommendation of the special appeals board. Utah
xtion 3. 1 0
Code Ann. §58-l-17(4)(b) (1990).
The Legislature has chosen to make the 3. Inasmuch as we may resolve t£$$ petition on staaction 3 requirements merely advisory as to tutory grounds, we do not reach the constitutional
sciprocity applicants. If the Division wishes arguments. See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
3 alter the Act to require that reciprocity 1103 (Utah 1988) (it is a fundamental rule that
pplicants have a doctoral degree from an appellate courts should avoid addressing constituticcredited school, its recourse is to the Legis- onal issues unless required to do so).
iture. The Division may not simply impose 4. Dr. Ferro's claim contains many first impression
additional requirements for psychologist lic- issues that are not even recognized in his brief. In
particular, Dr. Ferro's brief fails to show how this
nsure that are not contained within the plain administrative petition is an "action or proceeding
leaning of the statutory language." Fussell v. to enforce a provision of ... the Civil Rights Act of
department of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250, 254 1964." 42 U.S.C. §1988. The brief also does not
U t a h A p p . 1991)o
address the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Will v. Michigan Dcp't of State Police, 491 U.S.
CONCLUSION
58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989), that a state is not
Since the reciprocity provision allows the a "person* for purposes of section 1983 damages.
toard to make a finding as to whether Dr. Dr. Ferro's brief also ignores section 17 of the Utah
7
erro's credentials are in substantial compli- Administrative Procedures Act, which provides that
mce with the Act's requirements, we hold this court may award damages "only to the extent
expressly authorized by statute" when considering a
hat it was error for the Division to disqualify petition to review agency action. Utah Code Ann.
lim from the application process without the §63-46b-17(l)(a)(1989).
3oard conducting an individualized review of
5. If "statutory language is plain and unambiglis credentials. 1 1 We emphasize that our uous," we "will not look beyond to divine legislative
lolding should not be misconstrued as requi- intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a
ring that Dr. Ferro be admitted to practice statute should be construed according to its plain
psychology in Utah. Under the reciprocity language." Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134,
provision, that decision remains in the sound 763 P.2d 806,809 (Utah 1988).
6. But see State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah
discretion of the Board. 12
The Division's rejection of Dr. Ferro's 1977) (improper delegation of legislative powers);
Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 762 P.2d
application is hereby reversed.
1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988) (legislative policy
Russell W . Bench, Presiding Judge
decisions may not be delegated to agencies).
7. In an attempt to support its ruling on this matter,
I CONCUR:
the Division relies upon its own administrative rule
Leonard H . Russon, Judge
interpreting the Act. Rule R153-25a-4(2) (1991)
of the Utah Administrative Code provides, with our
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY:
emphasis, that "(ajn acceptable doctoral degree in
Judith M. Billings, Judge
psychology shall meet the following criteria: (a) the
degree shall have been received from an institution
1. Utah Code Ann. §58-25a-3(2) (1990) prov- of higher education in the United States or Canada
ides:
which was accredited by a regional institutional
accrediting body ... at the time the applicant's
Each applicant for admission to the
degree was earned.''
licensure examination shall:
The Division erroneously views its rule as deter(a) complete an application for admminative of the proper interpretation of the statute.
ission as specified by the division in
Given the established rule that agency regulations
collaboration with the board;
may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the
(b) produce satisfactory evidence that
statute creating the right or imposing the duty," IML
he is of good moral character;
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 297
(c) produce certified transcripts of
credit from an accredited institution of
(Utah 1975), it is the statute, not the rule, that
higher education recognized by the divgoverns. If an agency regulation is not in harmony
ision verifying satisfactory completion of
with the statute, it is invalid. Agency rules are thea doctoral degree in psychology. The
refore of little value in interpreting a statute unless
applicant must have also successfully
I the discretion to interpret the statute has been expcompleted specific core course work as
i licitiy or implicitly granted to the agency by the
defined by the division by rule;
| Legislature. Since in tnis case we hold that no sucn
i aiscretion was granted to the Division, we do not
(d) produce documented evidence that
teiv uDon its one in our nterpretation. We recogthe applicant has completed two vears ol
nize, lowever, that R.uie R153-25a-4 is in
supervised, protessionai experience, ol
i narmony witn the Act in that the rule incorporates
vhicn one year snail be postdoctoral in
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

35-1-67

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week.
Commencing July 1, 1974, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits
from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate sufficient
to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with employer or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission
of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of Bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided
in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in
excess of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week for 312 weeks.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §78; C*. L.
1917, §3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1 ; R, S.
1933, 42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1 ; 1939,
ch. 51, § 1 ; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch.
65, § 1 ; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1 ;
1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959,
ch. 55, § 1 ; 1961, ch. 71, § 1 ; 1963, ch. 49,
§ 1 ; 1965, ch. 68, § 1 ; 1967, ch. 65, § 1 ;
1969, ch. 86, § 5 ; 1971, ch. 76, § 6 ; 1973,
ch. 67, § 4 ; 1974, ch. 13, § 1.

maximum from $16 to $22.50 and weekly
minimum from $7 to $10; added a proviso
to the first sentence which read: "provided, however, that in no case of permanent total disability shall more than
$8,500 be required to be paid"; and added
a second paragraph which read: "In case
the permanent total disability begins after
a period of temporary total disability, the
period of temporary disability shall be
deducted from the total period of cornCompiler's Notes.
pensation."
The 1937 amendment inserted "plus
five
The 1949 amendment rewrote the section
per cent of such award for each dependent
to read: "In cases of permanent total disminor child, as in this act defined, up to
ability the award shall be sixty per cent
a maximum of five such dependent minor
of the average weekly wages for five years
children" in the first sentence; and deleted
from date of injury, and thereafter 45 per
"a minimum of" near the end of the first cent of such average weekly wages, but
sentence.
not to exceed a maximum of $25 per week
The 1939 amendment substituted "under
and not less than $15 per week, plus five
the age of eighteen years" for "as in this
per cent of such award for each dependent
act defined" in the first sentence.
minor child under the age of eighteen
The 1945 amendment deleted "until the
years up to a maximum of five such dedeath of such person so totally disabled"
pendent minor children; provided however,
xii Lhe *irst sentence; increased weeKly
that in no case of permanent total dis-

179

35-1-67
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ability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay more than
$11,000; and provided further, that a
finding by the commission of permanent
total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as the
following proceedings have been had:
"Where the employee has tentatively
been found to be permanently and totally
disabled, it shall be mandatory that the
industrial commission of Utah refer such
employee to the division of vocational
rehabilitation under the state board of
education for rehabilitation training and
it shall be the duty of the commission to
order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund
provided for by section 42-1-64, Utah Code
Annotated 1943? as amended, subdivision
1, not to exceed $520 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training
of such employee shall generally follow
the practice applicable under section 42-165, Utah Code Annotated 3943, as amended, and relating to the rehabilitation of
employees having combined injuries. If
and when the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with the
division of vocational rehabilitation in its
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the
opinion of the division the employee may
not be rehabilitated, then the .commission
shall order that there be paid tQ_ sueh
employee wegk^^bftUfi^tR a * thp ntp. of
4fT~per cent of his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $25 per week, iniiof that jpecial fund .nravid&d for by_§_g£s
tion 42-1-64, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
as amended, for such j>eriod of time_J>eginning with the times that the payments
(as in this section provided) to be made
by theempjoy^er or its insurance carrier
fi^mlnateand
ending, witft the death ^af
fhr^ntployeee £To employee, however, shall
ffQ eiltitTed'to any such payments if he
fails or refuses to co-operate with the
division of vocational rehabilitation as set
forth herein.
"The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to
the industrial commission of Utah the
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall,
after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the
employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily
function.
a
The loss or permanent and complete
loss of use of both hands or both arms,
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or

of any two thereof, shall constitute total
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of this
section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability shall be required
in such instances; in all other cases, however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be
based upon partial permanent disability, j
"In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in excess of
$11,000."
The 1951 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits allowable from $25
to $27.50; and increased the minimum
weekly benefits allowable from $15 to
$17.50.
The 1955 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits allowable for permanent total disability from $27.50 to
$30; increased the minimum weekly benefits allowable from $17.50 to $19.50; increased the percentage of award for dependent minor children from 5% to 7%;
increased the maximum payment allowable from $11,000 to $12,100; and increased the payment to a vocational rehabilitation division for the training of
such disabled employee from $520 to $600.
The 1957 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits allowable from $30
to $35; increased the minimum weekly
benefits allowable from $19.50 to $22.75;
increased the maximum payment allowable
from $12,100 to $14,116.71; and increased
the payment to a vocational rehabilitation
division for the training of such disabled
employee from $600 to $700.
The 1959 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $35 to $37; increased the minimum weekly benefits from
$22.75 to $24; increased the maximum payment allowable from $14,116.71 to $14,822.55; made provision for a dependent
wife and changed the basis of payment
for a dependent minor child from a percentage to a specific amount of $2.50;
reduced the number of dependent minor
children eligible for award from five to
four; and increased the payment to a vocational rehabilitation division for the
training of such disabled employee from
$700 to $735.
The 1961 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $37 to $39; increased the provisions for dependent wife
and minor children from $2.50 to $2.75;
and increased the maximum oavinent from
$14,822.55 to $15,415.
The 1963 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $39 to $40: increased the minimum weekly benefits from
$24 to .-B25; increased the provisions for

180

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
dependent wife and minor children from
$2.75 to $2.85; increased the payment to
the vocational rehabilitation division for
the training of such disabled employee
from $735 to $753; and increased the maximum payment allowable from $15,415 to
$15,800.
The 1965 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $40 to $42; increased the provisions for dependent wife
and minor children' from $2.85 to $3.60;
increased the payment to vocational rehabilitation division for the training of
such disabled employee from $753 to $830;
and increased the maximum payment allowable from $15,800 to $18,720.
The 1967 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $42 to $44;
and increased the maximum payment allowable from $18,720 to $19,344.
The 1969 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $44 to $47; increased the minimum weekly benefits from
$25 to $27; mereased the payment to the
vocational rehabilitation division for the
training of such disabled employee from
$830 to $890; and increased the maximum
payment allowable from $19,344 to $20,280.
The 1971 amendment increased the maximum weekly benefits from $47 to $54; increased the minimum weekly benefits from
$27 to $29; increased the provisions for
dependent wife and minor children from
$3.60 to $5.00; increased the maximum
payment allowable from $20,280 to $24,648; inserted the third paragraph relating
to the special fund; and made minor
changes in phraseology.
The 1973 amendment substituted "employee shall receive 6 6 ^ % * * * minimum
of $35" in the first sentence of the first
paragraph for "award shall be sixty per
cent of the actual weekly wages for five
years from date of injury, and thereafter
forty-five per cent of such average weekly
wages, but not to exceed a maximum of
$54 per week and not less than $29";
added "but not to exceed 66y3% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week" to the first sentence;
substituted "such weekly compensation
payments for more than 312 weeks" for
"more than $24,648" in the second sentence; changed the statutory references
from "35-1-68" to "35-1-68(1)" in the second paragraph; substituted "$1000" for
"$890" in the first sentence of the second
paragraph; substituted "662^% of his
average weekly wages at the time of the
injury * * * weekly wage at the time of
the injury" in the second sentence of the
second paragraph for "45% of his average
weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54";
substituted *benehts" lor "payments" n
^ho third sentence or the second paragraph; substituted "on that date or prior
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thereto were" for "now" in the third paragraph; substituted "$50" for "$44" in the
third paragraph; deleted "This section
shall apply to all persons permanently and
totally disabled who are now receiving
or hereafter become entitled to receive
compensation benefits from the special
fund" from the third paragraph; inserted
"or the insurance carrier" near the beginning of the final paragraph; and inserted
"as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66
and this section"; substituted "66%% of
the state average weekly wage * * * per
week for 312 weeks" for "$24,648" at the
end of the former fourth paragraph.
The 1974 amendment inserted the fourth
paragraph.
Arm injuries.
Where there was no complete and permanent loss or loss of use of both arms so
that claimant would be permanently disabled as matter of law, it was for commission to decide from all the facts and
circumstances in evidence whether he was
so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Conim.,
93 U. 493, 73 P. 2d 1308.
Determination of character of disability.,
Whether an employee is totally disabled
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided by the commission, as
ifc also amount and time compensation
may be awarded upon all the evidence;
and upon these ultimate questions expert
witnesses may not properly express opinions, nor may such opinions relating to
loss of bodily function become measure of
compensable function possessed by an
employee prior to his injury. Spencer v.
Industrial Comm., 87 U. 336, 40 P. 2d 1S8,
affd. 87 U. 358, 48 P. 2d 1120.
Where there had never been a determination by the commission that the injured employee was permanently disabled,
and where he did not have injuries which
entitled him to a conclusive presumption
of permanent disability, whether or not he
Was permanently disabled is a question of
fact to be decided by the commission on
all the evidence after notice to and hearing of the parties. Utah State Road Comm.
v. Industrial Comm., 109 U. 553, 168 P. 2d
319.
Uye injuries.
Injury to vision of employee from electric flash was not permanent total disability within this section. Moray v. Industrial Comm., 58 U. 404, 199 P. 1023, explained in 15 XT. (2d) 208, 390 P. 2d 125.
Findings.
Finding of commission upon ultimate
*"act or *otai ind permanent disanility,
nncic evidence is ('onriicting, will not be
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